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T I T L E
Dear Colleagues:  
In this second volume of 
Fordham Law’s Faculty Spotlight 
Journal, we feature four 
professors whose scholarship 
has been recognized with an 
award or has been named 
among the best scholarly 
articles in a particular field of 
law. These honors and accolades come from other top law schools, 
leading legal publications, and influential foundations and organiza-
tions. Clearly, the important scholarly work of the Law School’s 
talented faculty has caused others to take notice.
Of course, winning an award is not the ultimate measure of the worth of a legal article. All worthy scholarship 
should confront its readers with difficult questions and complex topics. Legal scholarship, therefore, should 
engage the lawyers, judges, professors, students, policymakers, officials, and politicians who wrestle with the 
multifaceted legal issues of the 21st century. The scholarship of the Fordham Law faculty succeeds in this 
critical engagement. Our professors write timely, compelling articles that question conventional wisdom and 
eschew easy answers or quick fixes. In other words, Fordham Law professors create great legal scholarship. 
The four faculty members in this journal are at the forefront of their respective fields: intellectual property, 
business and corporate law, and finance law. More than leading scholars, though, they are dedicated 
professors. Their scholarship is not only found in prominent law reviews; it is also taught in Fordham Law 
classrooms. In this way, our students learn about pathbreaking scholarship from the scholars themselves. 
The most favorable recognition of our professors’ scholarship, then, comes not from a “Best of” list but 
rather from the enthusiastic praise of our students. 
Michael M. Martin 
Dean and University Distinguished Professor of Law
F O R E W O R D
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T I T L E
The following pages highlight the 
scholarship of four Fordham Law 
faculty members whose incisive 
legal articles have earned them 
accolades outside the Fordham 
Law community. Their work 
challenges the status quo in 
their respective fields of 
business law and intellectual 
property law. As they continue to trace the ever-evolving contours of 
contemporary legal thought, they maintain the best traditions of 
Fordham Law’s scholar-teachers. 
I N T R O D U C T I O N
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Jeanne C. Fromer is one of the country’s foremost intellectual property law scholars. Her tremendous 
impact in the field was acknowledged by the American Law Institute when it awarded her one of its two 
inaugural Young Scholars Medals. Her scholarship exploring the differences between copyright and patent 
law, as well as the constitutionality of select intellectual property laws, has brilliantly forecast the explosive 
growth of this increasingly important field of law. In addition to anticipating the critical significance of the 
intersection between copyright and patent law, her scholarship, including her compelling article 
“Patentography,” proposes unique solutions to longstanding problems in IP law.
Sean J. Griffith’s scholarship examines the regulation of business and enterprises and recommends novel 
ways to improve the regulatory scheme. His trenchant analysis of such sophisticated topics as D&O 
insurance has situated him as an expert in the field of corporate law. In Griffith’s view, the only thing worse 
than no regulation is feckless regulation; for this reason, he offers nuanced suggestions for certain types of 
financial institutions to run effectively and with proper accountability.
Sonia Katyal maintains an acute multidisciplinary approach in her scholarship—a keen perspective that 
deftly melds intellectual property law, technology, and art. Her articles force readers to re-examine basic 
assumptions of the law as it relates to both established and emerging media. Her findings offer provocative 
new ways of looking at complex legal situations. For example, her book Property Outlaws posits that 
individuals acting near the margins of the law are responsible for improved legal regulation. Her forthcoming 
book Contrabrand will doubtless burnish her already bright legal reputation.
Richard Squire distills complex finance law topics to their purest essence. In his most recent scholarship, 
he attacks the hydra of contingent debt to expose a bitter truth: while contingent debt and its accompanying 
conduct, “correlation-seeking,” may benefit shareholders, these behaviors only harm the greater social 
wealth of the general populace. In uncovering hidden problems within our country’s financial system, 
Squire’s critical examination of these byzantine borrowing arrangements may help us avoid other large-scale 
market disturbances. 
Sheila R. Foster 
Vice Dean 
Albert A. Walsh ’54 Chair in Real Estate, Land Use and Property Law
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Today, intellectual property can often be a company’s most valuable asset, playing a major role in corporate 
deals and litigation. The law has adjusted accordingly. Gone are the days when patent, copyright, and trade-
mark were specialized fields whose practitioners rarely tread into other legal domains. With the growth of intel-
lectual property litigation and transactional work, intellectual property spills into several other areas of the law.
Associate Professor Jeanne C. Fromer has witnessed intellectual property’s evolution firsthand. Now she 
stands at the forefront of exploring its development. A graduate of Columbia University, with a B.A. in com-
puter science, and of MIT, where she earned an S.M. in electrical engineering and computer science, Fromer 
had a natural affinity for law and technology as she pursued her J.D. from Harvard Law School. She went on 
to work as an attorney at Hale and Dorr LLP, solidifying her specialty in intellectual property. Since joining 
the Fordham faculty in 2007, she has taught intellectual property while pursuing scholarship that challenges 
assumed notions of the field. Are certain federal IP laws unconstitutional? Might the different theories justify-
ing intellectual property protection—principally, utilitarianism and deontological thinking—work together in 
useful harmony? What role does a psychological understanding of creativity have to play in copyright, patent, 
and trademark law? What does Willy Wonka’s chocolate factory have to teach us about trade secrecy? 
Her work has drawn the praise of prominent organizations in the field. Two of her articles—“Expressive 
Incentives in Intellectual Property,” forthcoming in the Virginia Law Review, and “Claiming Intellectual 
Property” in the University of Chicago Law Review—have been selected for presentation at the prestigious 
Stanford-Yale Junior Faculty Forum. The 2009 edition of Thomson/West’s Intellectual Property Law Review 
included one of her articles, “The Layers of Obviousness in Patent Law” from the Harvard Journal of Law 
and Technology, as one of the best intellectual property articles of 2008. In 2011, the American Law 
Institute awarded her its inaugural Young Scholars Medal for her scholarship in intellectual property. In par-
ticular, “Patentography” in the New York University Law Review and “Claiming Intellectual Property” caught 
the institute’s attention.
“Patentography” advocates trying patent cases in the district of the defendant’s principal place of business. 
Not only would this approach control forum shopping for favorable outcomes, but it would also increase the 
proficiency of the cluster of district courts most likely to hear IP cases about a particular technology or 
industry. As a result, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—the federal appellate court given 
exclusive jurisdiction over nearly all patent cases—would likely give more credence to the factual findings of 
the district courts. 
With “Claiming Intellectual Property,” Fromer questions the rationale for treating patent and copyright law so 
differently with regard to claiming practice. Whereas patent law protects the characteristics of an invention 
principally through peripheral claiming by characteristic, copyright law protects the work in a fixed form 
mainly through central claiming by exemplar. Fromer points out how patent claim drafting can be flexible 
enough to allow some form of central claiming by characteristic and by exemplar, which makes it easier for 
the public to know what material it can license and what it can use freely. Copyright law is more complicat-
ed. Even though making copyright claiming look more like that in patent law might seem to be a grand 
improvement, certain key aspects of the copyright system ought to give significant pause before moving in 
that direction.
Jeanne C. Fromer
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Excerpts
Patentography
85 New York University Law Review 1444 (2010)  
(excerpted from pages 1445-49, 1486-88, 1496-99, 1503, 1505)
For years, commentators and legislators have criticized the structure and quality of patent litigation. They 
have three principal complaints. First, they demonstrate that plaintiffs frequently engage in forum shopping 
in choosing a district court, selecting the district that provides the best strategic advantages to their case. A 
recent target of this critique is the Eastern District of Texas, which handled nearly thirteen percent of all pat-
ent cases in 2008, the highest proportion in the country, in large part due to the perception that it is friendly 
to patent holders. Forum shopping can be harmful to the legal system by distorting the substantive law, by 
showcasing the inequities of granting plaintiffs an often outcome-determinative choice among many district 
courts, and by causing numerous economic inefficiencies, including inconveniences to the parties. This 
problem has so caught Congress’s attention that fixing it has been a mainstay of many of its recent attempts 
at patent reform.
Second, critics maintain that the district courts are not doing a good job of handling patent litigation. In 
recent years, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—the appellate court with exclusive 
jurisdiction over almost all patent appeals—has frequently reversed district court decisions. The Federal 
Circuit reverses district courts twenty-two percent of the time, a noteworthy figure because the reversal rate 
for all civil litigation in the federal courts is just over eighteen percent. Federal Circuit reversal rates are even 
higher for certain critical issues, like claim construction, for which the appellate court reverses district courts 
almost forty percent of the time. Critics suggest that generalist district court judges lack a grasp both of pat-
ent law’s intricacies, given how rarely they judge patent cases, and of the technical facts affecting the law’s 
application, as they typically are not experts in patented technologies. Politicians and academics alike have 
suggested different solutions, including creating specialized patent trial courts, possibly with expert judges, 
and training some judges in the most patent-heavy district courts in patent law. There are downsides to 
these solutions, however, including the possibilities of tunnel vision and bias for a specialist court.
Beyond the critiques of district courts’ limited factfinding ability, some critics find a (possibly related) third 
problem in the structure of patent litigation. They argue that the Federal Circuit does not defer frequently 
enough to the district courts’ factual findings and instead, on appeal, reviews their findings de novo—either 
expressly or while claiming review under a more deferential standard—a task for which the Federal Circuit is 
not well suited. These critics think that the district courts proficiently evaluate and find facts under at least 
some circumstances. As such, they conclude that district courts’ factual findings ought to be given more 
credence, particularly given that factual findings are a substantial component of judicial determinations in 
patent law.
In this Article, I suggest that these three key concerns can all be addressed in substantial part by taking 
account of patentography—the geography of patent disputes. I propose making patent venue proper only in 
the district in which the principal place of business of any of a case’s defendants is located, with a safety 
valve to avoid due process concerns, which might occur [for] a minute number [of plaintiffs for whom severe 
inconvenience of suit leaves them, for all intents and purposes, without any redress for the wrong of patent 
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infringement]. Recent congressional bills constraining patent venue take an advisable step in this direction 
by making the defendant’s principal place of business one of the major categories of venue possibilities, but 
their rules are inadvisably permissive. Moreover, congressional reformers seem not to appreciate just how 
efficacious thoughtful venue constraints might be in improving patent litigation beyond merely clamping 
down on forum shopping.
In addition to nearly eliminating forum shopping, constraining venue as I propose would improve district 
courts’ decisionmaking and encourage the Federal Circuit to defer more appropriately to district courts’ fac-
tual findings. I argue that these two effects stem from how patent cases would be distributed under my pro-
posal. Although Kimberly Moore (now a judge on the Federal Circuit) and Rochelle Dreyfuss contend that 
restricting venue choices would too widely disperse patent suits among the nation’s district courts, I argue 
that the opposite would occur because of the clustered nature of patentography. Constricting venue as I pro-
pose will tend to group patent cases involving particular technologies or industries in a limited number of 
districts. Industries tend to cluster around particular geographic centers, such as the pharmaceutical indus-
try in New Jersey and the software industry in Silicon Valley and the Boston and Seattle areas. 
Consequently, restricting patent venue to the principal place of business of a defendant will lead to a con-
centration of an industry’s patent suits in the districts where that industry’s firms are densest. Under my pro-
posed venue rules, pharmaceutical suits will likely cluster in the District of New Jersey and software patent 
suits will likely group themselves in the Northern District of California, the District of Massachusetts, and the 
Western District of Washington.
When this clustering occurs, a handful of district courts will adjudicate many patent cases in particular tech-
nologies or industries. The resulting proficiency gains will help those courts serve both as skilled factfinders 
in developing case records and as patent laboratories for tailoring patent law to promote innovation in their 
particular clustered technologies or industries. In this light, I suggest that arguments to create specialized 
trial courts for patent law are generally misguided. Patent law needs more accurate, efficient, and thoughtful 
judicial resolution of controversies not through a set of district courts handling only patent cases, but via 
generalist district courts that naturally hear clusters of patent cases involving one industry or group of tech-
nologies, developing a proficiency in the industry-specific issues that commonly arise. Moreover, local judg-
es’ and juries’ [typically] elevated familiarity with a district’s leading industries would produce better rea-
soned decisions than would their counterparts in arbitrary locations. As such, my proposal builds on joint 
work by Dan Burk and Mark Lemley, which suggests that courts can and do tailor patent law to particular 
technologies or industries, with the aim of providing appropriate incentives to innovate under the particular 
circumstances of that industry.
Were this clustering effect to obtain, the Federal Circuit, as the exclusive court of appeals for nearly all patent 
litigation, would then have the advantage of these collected, well-reasoned opinions when reviewing and set-
ting the appropriate patent rules for each industry or technology. Given an improvement in the quality of dis-
trict court opinions, the Federal Circuit then ought to feel more comfortable granting greater deference to the 
district courts’ many factual findings and could focus its energies on appellate lawmaking, its intended role.
Some might argue that my proposal risks systemic bias or capture in the district courts. For instance, if the 
district courts in the Northern District of California were to see many software patent cases between local 
defendants and varying groups of plaintiffs, those courts might come to identify with, or be captured by, the 
interests of local defendants in software patent cases. If such bias proliferated, it might render individual 
decisions suspect and prejudice the law in one direction or another.
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This problem, however, is less severe than it might seem. Any such bias falls in line with venue generally, 
which tends to focus on defendants and their convenience. . . . Moreover, to the extent there is bias,  
[significant evidence indicates that] it already exists in the other direction—toward plaintiffs—under the cur-
rent structure. . . . Therefore, a shift to requiring suit in the principal place of business of a defendant would 
merely shift existing structural biases away from the plaintiff to the defendant.
Furthermore, a variety of defendants exist, which should diminish bias. . . . [Additionally], it is thought that a 
substantial majority of patent cases are between parties working in the same industry, a fact which, if true, 
would make it harder for district court judges to rule against plaintiffs by crafting industry-specific, defen-
dant-friendly rules.
To [demonstrate the effects of my proposed venue rule], I evaluate empirical data of all utility patent litigation 
filed in 2005 to compare existing technology-specific clusters of patent suits in the district courts with a sim-
ulation of how these suits would hypothetically have clustered under my proposed venue rule. Relying on 
these comparisons, I demonstrate that more robust and natural technology-specific clusters would form 
under my proposal.
[To show that my venue rule will lead to the clustering I propose, consider two representative technology-
specific segments found in my data. T]here are 579 cases in which at least one of the patents being litigated 
is for a computer or communications technology. Figure 1 shows these cases by actual district on a geo-
graphic heatmap, while Figure 2 shows the simulated distribution of the same cases by district under my 
restrictive venue rule. Table 1 lists the top ten districts for computer and communication patent cases 
(under both the actual and hypothetical scenarios) along with the number of cases, the ranking of districts 
for these cases, and the percentage of total patent cases in each district. The actual distribution shows that 
there are strong clusters, particularly in the Eastern District of Texas (94 cases), the Northern District of 
California (64), the Central District of California (47), and the Northern District of Illinois (45). There is a mix 
of districts in this list: Some are known to be centers of innovation in computers and communications tech-
nology—like the Northern District of California—and some are known to host almost no such technology—
most pertinently, the Eastern District of Texas, suspected by many to be a popular choice as a plaintiff-
friendly haven, particularly for software patentees. By contrast, the hypothetical distribution shows strong 
clustering effects, although the clusters resulting from forum shopping disappear in this simulation. There 
are no longer any clusters in the Eastern District of Texas or in the District of Delaware (which had 30 cases 
under the current rule). In the hypothetical distribution, the clusters are more naturally located in districts 
hosting substantial swaths of the American software industry: the Northern District of California (98.937), 
Central District of California (56.798), Northern District of Illinois (39.643), Southern District of New York 
(32.397), District of New Jersey (28.238), and Western District of Washington (20.075).
[Figure 3 shows the] actual clusters . . . for . . . earth working and wells patents (33 cases in total) . . . [It] 
shows actual clustering in the Southern District of Texas, with 7 cases, the Eastern District of Texas, with 4, 
and the Eastern District of Louisiana, with 3. [Figure 4], by contrast, . . . show[s] more intense hypothetical 
cluster[ing] for th[is] same technolog[y] under my proposed rule. [It] shows extremely dense clustering in 
the Southern District of Texas, with 14 cases, which ought to be unsurprising given the concentrated pres-
ence of the oil industry there.
Relying on theory and the data, I argue that my proposed rule is preferable to the status quo. The simula-
tion’s clusters would form naturally without allowing plaintiffs to shop for the most strategically advantageous 
forum. These natural clusters would also occur in optimal locations. Because a district’s judges and juries 
are drawn from the vicinity of the region’s natural industry clusters, they will tend to know more about the 
cluster of industries nearby and be better situated to evaluate patent scope, validity, infringement, and other 
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issues in the context of what enhances innovation in that industry. These clusters would also be more stable 
because industry clusters do not often shift geographically in short periods of time, whereas artificial, forum-
shopping-based clusters do.
Although this Article is situated in patent law, its reasoning and conclusions extend to other legal fields. For 
areas of law that share patent law’s pertinent characteristics—factual or legal complexities keyed to particu-
lar industries—similar venue constraints might be appropriate, the better to take advantage of clustering’s 
salutary effects on accurate adjudication.
 
Figure 1 
Actual Computer & Communication Cases by District (n = 582)
	  
 
Figure 2 
Simulated Computer & Communication Cases by District (n = 582)
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Table 1 
Distribution of Computer & Communication Cases Among District Courts
Hypothetical 
Percentage of 
Computer & 
Communication 
Patent Cases
Actual Percentage 
of Computer & 
Communication 
Patent Cases
Hypothetical 
Ranking
Actual  
Ranking
Number of 
Hypothetical  
Cases
Number of  
Actual CasesDistrict
2.3%16.2%13113.28394
Eastern District  
of Texas
17%11%1298.93764
Northern District  
of California
9.9%8.2%2357.79848
Central District  
of California
6.8%7.7%3439.64345
Northern District  
of Illinois
5.6%6.9%4532.39740
Southern District of  
New York
0.9%5.2%2765.130
District of  
Delaware
2.7%3.3%9715.98719
Northern District  
of Georgia
2.6%2.9%11815.33117
Southern District  
of Florida
3%2.7%8917.48316
Northern District  
of Texas
4.9%2.6%51028.23815
District of  
New Jersey
1.7%2.6%17109.73915
Western District  
of Texas
3.3%2.2%71219.27413
District of  
Massachusetts
3.4%1.9%61320.07511
Western District  
of Washington
2.7%1.7%101515.57410
District of  
Minnesota
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Figure 3 
Actual Earth Working & Wells Cases by District (n = 33)
	  
 
Figure 4 
Simulated Earth Working & Wells Cases by District  
(n = 33)
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Claiming Intellectual Property 
76 University of Chicago Law Review 719 (2009) (excerpted from pages 720-24)
By writing a series of James Bond novels, Ian Fleming qualified for American copyright protection, pursuant 
to which works created by others without license and found by courts to be substantially similar to the novels 
would generally infringe his copyright. Imagine instead that Fleming would have had to draft a claim setting 
out his novels’ essential features, such as “a story featuring a suave male British spy, who frequently wears a 
tuxedo and has a strong sensual appetite, and detailing his adventures in international intrigue, in which he 
prevails through use of his quick wit and high-technology gadgets.” Dependent claims might further note 
that the spy introduces himself by his last name followed by his full name (“Bond, James Bond”) and that he 
orders his martinis “shaken, not stirred.” Copyright protection would then be premised on the bounds delin-
eated by these claims. Infringement litigation might then need to address how often is “frequently” or 
whether a film featuring a similar female British character (“Bond, Jane Bond”) infringes the copyright.
This hypothetical claiming system looks like that of patent law, under which an invention’s bounds must be 
demarcated as a prerequisite to patent protection. But envision for a moment that patent claiming would 
look more like that of copyright law. Alexander Graham Bell would receive a patent for his invention of the 
telephone after having fixed (or perhaps commercialized) it in some form. Assuming the invention complies 
with the threshold requirements of patent law, the set of protected embodiments would include all substan-
tially similar implementations—a cordless telephone? a fax machine? Internet telephony?—a set to be enu-
merated on a case-by-case basis in any future infringement litigation, rather than at the time of patenting. 
This determination would require courts to ascertain the essential properties of a patented invention.
This thought experiment seems to indicate that claiming the set of protected embodiments under patent law 
looks very different than copyright law. And in a sense, it does. Patent law has adopted a system of peripher-
al claiming, requiring patentees to articulate their inventions’ bounds by the time of the patent grant, usually 
by listing their necessary and sufficient characteristics. Peripheral claims in patent law are conventionally 
thought to give notice to the public of the extent of the set of protected embodiments so as to encourage effi-
cient investment in innovation, thereby fostering patent law’s overarching goal of stimulating useful innova-
tion by maintaining “the delicate balance between inventors, who rely on the promise of the law to bring the 
invention forth, and the public, which should be encouraged to pursue innovations, creations, and new 
ideas beyond the inventor’s exclusive rights.”1 And copyright law has implicitly adopted a system of central 
claiming by exemplar, requiring the articulation only of a prototypical member of the set of protected 
works—namely, the copyrightable work itself fixed in a tangible form. Copyright protection then extends 
beyond the exemplar to substantially similar works, a set of works to be enumerated only down the road in 
case-by-case infringement litigation. Investigating the claiming practices of patent and copyright law side by 
side thus illuminates two salient axes for claiming intellectual property: peripheral versus central and charac-
teristic versus exemplar. Though scholarship mentions patent law’s peripheral claims and Clarisa Long and 
1  Festo Corp v Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co, 535 US 722, 731 (2002).
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Henry Smith discuss patent law’s claiming requirements and copyright law’s lack thereof,2 until now these 
dual claiming dimensions have not been expressly appreciated.
Despite patent law’s typical peripheral claims by characteristic and copyright law’s typical central claims by 
exemplar, in practice, patent and copyright claiming are each heterogeneous. Patent law retains some ves-
tiges of central claiming under which it used to operate, as evidenced by the doctrine of equivalents, statuto-
ry means-plus-function claiming, and dependent claims. And patent law, though usually claiming by charac-
teristic, encourages some claiming by exemplar through its best-mode requirement and Markush claims. By 
contrast, copyright law, through the approved use of licenses to permit others to make substantially similar 
works, encourages expression of the bounds of works permissibly created under such licenses and the 
delineation of characteristic features of the set of protected works. These expressions in legally binding con-
tracts incorporate forms of peripheral claiming and claiming by characteristic into copyright practice.
This Article explores which forms of claiming promote intellectual property’s overarching constitutional goal: 
“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”3 It considers how each sort of claiming 
affects the costs of drafting claims, efficacy of notice to the public of the set of protected embodiments 
(“content notice”), ascertainment of protectability, breadth of the set of protected works, and ability to defer 
to the future the decision of whether certain works (typically those that are technologically, commercially, or 
intellectually unforeseeable) fall within the set of protected works. That the choice of claiming systems impli-
cates in different ways the foregoing factors— factors essential to calibrating intellectual property law to 
stimulate innovation—underscores the importance of choosing a claiming system with care.
Though previous scholarship principally defends the typical claiming forms for both patent and copyright 
law, this Article undertakes a thought experiment to analyze whether they are ideal for either type of intellec-
tual property. This task, in fact, is suggested by patent law’s incorporation of not insignificant elements of 
central and exemplar claiming and copyright practice’s use of peripheral and characteristic claiming. This 
Article explores whether claiming in copyright and patent law can learn from one another.
Though patent law admirably incorporates all four types of claiming flexibly, it can be tweaked to stimulate 
innovation by adding claiming elements more reminiscent of copyright law. I suggest that patent law’s typical 
peripheral claims by characteristic, adopted principally to provide content notice of the set of embodiments 
protected by a patent, do not provide sufficient notice, which negatively affects assessments of protectability 
and the operational breadth of the set of protected works. To ameliorate these and other concerns, I pro-
pose—contrary to conventional wisdom—that ex ante patent claim drafting be modified to include central 
claiming by characteristic. And claiming by exemplar ought to serve a role in patent law. Claims by charac-
teristic can be supplemented by rules requiring the registration of certain exemplars—all commercial imple-
mentations by the patentee or licensee—claimed to be within the set of protected embodiments. Exemplar 
registration, which would be available to the public and linked to the associated patent, would help sharpen 
the understanding of the bounds of the set of protected embodiments. And it would occur in the situations 
in which exemplars are most useful, when the patented invention is commercialized and is therefore likely to 
be valuable—when content notice is important. These modifications to patent claiming would better serve 
2  See Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 499-501 (2004) (describing the 
differences between patent and copyright law with respect to how each handles the information asymmetry between 
owners and observers); Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property As Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 
YALE L.J. 1742, 1807 (2007) (contrasting copyright and patent claiming rights and the governance regimes generated 
as a result of those rights).
3  US ConSt Art I, § 8, cl 8.
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patent law’s purpose to stimulate innovation by making it easier for the public to distinguish between materi-
al that must be licensed to be used and material that can be used freely for follow-up innovation.
Claiming in copyright law is more complicated. On the one hand, the comparative analysis of claiming 
approaches might seem to suggest that claiming in copyright law would be vastly improved by incorporating 
aspects more evocative of patent claims. On the other hand, aspects particular to copyright law suggest that 
such borrowing might not make sense in the copyright system. As it stands, copyright’s central claims by 
exemplar provide little content notice to the public, leading risk-averse third parties either to take licenses 
even as to works not protected by copyright or to avoid them completely, a situation that grants too heavy a 
copyright reward at the expense of generating further creativity. In that vein, it might seem far more produc-
tive to require or provide significant incentive to copyright claimants ex ante to claim their works centrally by 
characteristic. This claiming would entail a succinctly expressed pattern of the work at issue. On this view, 
such claims would provide better ex ante content notice in two ways. First, the enablement of feature-by-
feature comparisons could help indicate those works that would be considered to be substantially similar to 
the created work and thus protected under the copyright. Second, such claims could help explicate which 
substantially similar works would nonetheless be permissible uses under the doctrine of fair use by encour-
aging straightforward determinations of works that borrow from the copyrighted work in ways that do not 
implicate too many of the claimed features or transform it significantly. On the other hand, aspects integral 
to the copyright system—including its fine line between protecting expression but not ideas, grounded in 
the First Amendment; societal views on describing the artistic works copyright protects; and the ease of cre-
ating copyrightable works—give significant pause to any notion of adopting central claiming by characteristic 
in copyright.
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Sean J. Griffith
In a time of financial crisis, how do you keep tabs on industries so they have room to flourish without  
putting the economy further at risk? The question has attracted a growing audience to the scholarship of 
Professor Sean J. Griffith, T.J. Maloney Chair in Business Law at Fordham Law and leading expert in the 
regulation of business. 
A magna cum laude graduate of Harvard Law School, Griffith honed his specialty in corporate and securities 
law while working as an associate in the corporate department of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz in New 
York, focusing on public company mergers and acquisitions. Griffith teaches corporate law and governance 
at Fordham Law, which he joined in 2006. 
A three-part series of articles Griffith co-wrote with Tom Baker on how directors’ and officers’ liability insur-
ance affects corporate governance won multiple “best of the year” plaudits and led to a book, Ensuring 
Corporate Misconduct: How Liability Insurance Undermines Shareholder Litigation (University of Chicago 
Press, 2010). The book argues that D&O insurance undermines the primary purpose of shareholder law-
suits—to act as a deterrent against corporate malfeasance. The threat of shareholder litigation is supposed 
to force companies to play by the rules, but D&O insurance lets them transplant that risk to the insurer. This 
leaves the executive officers free to steer their companies in dangerous directions because they know they 
won’t have to pay the price for potentially disastrous decisions. The D&O insurers themselves don’t do as 
much as they could to hold their clients more accountable, acting more as insulation for bad governance 
than safeguards against it. Griffith and Baker propose ways that D&O insurers could change the way they do 
business to keep their corporate clients on the straight and narrow, such as maintaining better control over 
defense and settlement and monitoring their clients with loss-prevention programs similar to the kind used 
by other fields of insurance.
In his most recent article, “Governing Systemic Risk: Towards a Governance Structure for Derivatives 
Clearinghouses” (forthcoming, Emory Law Journal, 2012), Griffith suggests that the application of ineffec-
tive regulation may be just as detrimental as the absence of it. The article critiques the proposed governing 
system for derivatives clearing houses and offers a more elegant solution. Created to monitor derivatives 
trades and build reserves against default, clearinghouses are funded with private capital yet they serve a 
public purpose. As public-private entities, they can’t quite be governed as businesses but can’t quite be 
governed as public-interest institutions either. To run these unique organizations, Griffith proposes a dual 
governing body modeled after the supervisory boards of German corporations, which have some members 
who answer to shareholders and others who answer to employees. Griffith’s clearinghouse boards would be 
made up of directors elected by commercial interests that want the clearinghouse to succeed as a business 
and an equal number of directors elected by public interest to contain risk at the clearinghouse. The two 
groups would balance each other out and their separate charges of accountability would help assure that 
neither side oversteps their bounds. 
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Excerpts 
Governing Systemic Risk:  
Towards a Governance Structure for Derivatives Clearinghouses
Forthcoming, Emory Law Journal 2012
Introduction
In targeting derivatives for regulatory reform, policy-makers have fastened upon the idea of centralizing 
counterparty credit risk in a single place, a clearinghouse, where it can be supervised and managed. 
Clearinghouses are a public-private solution to the problem of systemic risk. Funded with private capital to 
serve commercial ends as well as the public purpose of containing systemic risk, clearinghouses provide a 
means for monitoring derivatives trades and, more importantly perhaps, for building reserves against default 
so that if one party to a derivatives transaction defaults on its contractual obligation, the consequences of 
the default will be contained within the clearinghouse and not spread throughout the broader financial sys-
tem. In order for this strategy of containment to work, however, much depends upon how the clearinghouse 
is governed. Specifically, much depends on how the clearinghouse models the risk of derivatives instru-
ments, what the clearinghouse requires of its members in terms of credit-quality and contributions to collat-
eral and reserve funds, and what products the clearinghouse accepts for clearing. These are core issues of 
risk management, and they depend ultimately on clearinghouse governance.
Recognizing that clearinghouse governance is critically important for the management of systemic risk, poli-
cy-makers have sought to engineer governance structures for clearinghouses. Unfortunately, the policy-
makers’ proposals have generally failed to address the pervasive free-riding problem underlying clearing-
house governance. Because no private party stands to enjoy a benefit equal to the costs of controlling sys-
temic risk, no private party can be expected fully to internalize these costs. Worse, each of the major com-
mercial interests involved in derivatives clearing faces a moral hazard problem—that is, an incentive to 
engage in excessive risk taking as a result of the fact that a significant portion of the cost of that party’s 
actions are borne by others. These incentive problems are a fundamental outgrowth of the public-private 
nature of the clearinghouse.
Derivatives and Systemic Risk
The global financial crisis began when the bubble in the U.S. housing market that had been inflated by a 
combination of government policy, unscrupulous lending practices, and financial engineering finally burst in 
2007. Because the risks of the housing market had been repackaged, split into smaller pieces, and widely 
distributed, the effects soon spread throughout the entire economy. The financial technology that enabled 
this risk to spread included, principally, securitization, but also derivatives.
Derivatives contributed to the crisis in two basic ways—the first having to do with the stimulating of the mar-
ket for the underlying reference asset, in this case subprime mortgages, and the second having to do with 
the accumulation of counterparty credit risk in large financial institutions. 
The regulation of OTC derivatives under Title VII of the Act has three primary goals: (1) the minimization of 
systemic risk from derivatives trading, (2) the establishment of transparency in derivatives markets, and (3) 
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the creation of credit protection for derivatives counterparties. Moreover, under the statute, each of these 
basic goals is to be accomplished largely through a single structural innovation—that is, the introduction of 
central counterparties or “clearinghouses” in derivatives trading. The core idea, in other words, is to move as 
much OTC derivatives trading as possible onto clearinghouses and, wherever possible, onto exchanges and 
thus to eliminate, or at least minimize, bilateral trading in favor of centralization. 
Starting from the statutory mandate, the regulatory agencies acknowledged the presence of incentive prob-
lems on the part of the various commercial parties that might lead to a reduction in clearinghouse access, 
on the one hand, or to a failure to manage and contain systemic risk, on the other. Noting the potential for 
conflict between these goals, the regulatory agencies sought to design governance structures that would 
respond to each problem. The governance structures they propose have two basic foci: voting power and 
governance. The voting power rules impose a set of caps on clearinghouse members’ voting interests, and 
the governance rules focus on the independence of the clearinghouse board of directors and the composi-
tion of certain board committees.
Critiquing the Proposed Rulemaking
Voting Caps
Voting caps conflict with the basic corporate law premise that voting interests should be aligned with owner-
ship interests. This is so because when an investor has voting control that is disproportionate to her owner-
ship interest, she has an incentive to use her voting power to increase her distribution of benefits from the 
firm at the expense of other owners’ proportional interests. The misalignment of ownership and voting, in 
other words, creates moral hazard.
The moral hazard problem may be especially acute in clearinghouses. Dealers bear by far the greatest 
amount of risk in clearinghouses. If voting caps function as intended, they will limit the ability of dealers to 
exert a level of control commensurate with the risk they bear. Instead, non-dealer equity holders, who suffer 
loss only after the dealer-funded reserves have been exhausted, will enjoy significantly greater control than 
the amount of risk they bear. 
Equity owners who enjoy voting rights in excess of their risk may seek to clear inappropriate instruments or 
to underweight risk in order to capture additional volume, understanding that they suffer only when losses 
are large enough to destroy the clearinghouse but they benefit from dollar one of profit.
It is sufficient, therefore, to reject the current voting cap proposals as ineffective. 
Independence
The other key component of the regulatory agencies’ proposed governance rules is mandatory minimum 
numbers of independent directors on clearinghouse boards and board committees. That the regulators 
should seize upon director independence in the clearinghouse context is, in one sense, unsurprising since 
director independence is, after all, a familiar corporate governance remedy. It has been suggested as the 
solution to incentive problems arising from the demand requirement in derivative suits, management buy-
outs, takeover defenses, self-dealing transactions, and perhaps most famously in Sarbanes-Oxley, as a cure 
for accounting scandals such as those that occurred at Enron and Worldcom. In those contexts, however, 
independence has a different meaning than it does here. There, and indeed generally in discourse about 
corporate governance, independence is taken to mean a director who is not also a member of management 
or controlled by someone else who is. Here, however, independence means, basically, not a large dealer. 
This is not quite (indeed not nearly) the same idea, and the unintended consequences that this distinction is 
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likely to have on clearinghouse governance is a good reason to reject the attempt to use independence to 
solve the governance problems of clearinghouses. But it is not the only reason. Another equally good, if not 
better, reason is that independence simply does not work. There is no good reason to believe that indepen-
dence solves corporate governance problems generally or that it will solve clearinghouse governance prob-
lems in particular.
A New Path
The basic undercurrents of the discussion to this point have been problems of moral hazard and free-riding. 
A recurring moral hazard problem underlies the incentives of each of the parties most likely to become 
involved in clearinghouse governance. And the central function of the clearinghouse—that is, the manage-
ment of systemic risk—has revealed itself to have the character of a public good, leading to a pervasive  
free-rider problem.
Putting these two insights together, the optimal clearinghouse governance structure would seem to require 
a separate governing body with a public charge—the containment of systemic risk. Additionally, in order to 
be rendered accountable to that public interest, the governing body must be appointed directly by electors 
representing that interest. The optimal clearinghouse governance structure thus would have a dual aspect, 
guided in part by commercial interests seeking to ensure the sustainability of the clearinghouse from a 
business perspective, and in part by the public interest in managing systemic risk. These two aspects of 
clearinghouse governance would interact for the good of the clearinghouse—the failure of either interest 
dooms both—but their separate foci and separate lines of accountability assure that neither interest 
absorbs the other.
Co-determination of the supervisory board, found in German corporations, is a structural solution designed 
to guarantee that German corporations remain accountable to both shareholders and employees. 
Shareholders vote for shareholder representatives, and employees vote for employee (often union) represen-
tatives, an arrangement designed to ensure the accountability of board members to these respective inter-
ests. The two sets of interests then work together through their representatives on the supervisory board.
This board structure presents an appealing model for clearinghouse governance because it presents a for-
mal means of guaranteeing accountability, not, in the case of clearinghouses, to employee interests, but 
rather to the public interest in managing systemic risk. The parallel in the context of clearinghouses would 
thus be a mechanism for electing board members to render them accountable to the public interest of  
containing systemic risk rather than the commercial interests underwriting the clearinghouse. 
To effectuate this dual board structure, the electors of clearinghouse boards would likewise need to be split 
into two classes—into the electors of the traditional directors, on the one hand, and the electors of the 
supervisory directors, on the other. As regards the electors of the traditional directors, because the special 
requirements of the clearinghouse—that is, the management and control of systemic risk—are to be the 
central focus of the supervisory directors, there would seem to be no reason to interfere with the basic norm 
of shareholder primacy in electing the traditional directors. This Article therefore recommends the abandon-
ment of the voting caps and independence requirements recommended by the SEC and the CFTC in favor of 
a system that allows the traditional directors to be elected by whatever commercial interests come to own 
the clearinghouse. A consequence of this approach may be that the major dealers come to dominate the  
traditional directors, but this is not necessarily a negative outcome in light of the importance, described 
above, in matching control with risk-bearing. Moreover, the supervisory directors would stand as a counter-
weight to any excesses of traditional directors under the influence of the major dealers.
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While some details remain to be specified, the thrust of this Article’s proposals should by now be clear. Its 
central policy recommendation, simply stated, is to establish a separately elected class of directors who will 
remain accountable to the public interest in clearinghouse governance and whose authority will be generally 
co-equal with those members of the clearinghouse board elected by the various commercial interests. 
Understanding that this is not the appropriate forum to pursue a finely tuned body of rules, this Article will 
recommend simply that the details follow from that basic statement of intent.
Ensuring Corporate Misconduct:  
How Liability Insurance Undermines Shareholder Litigation
Co-authored with Tom Baker, University of Chicago Press, 2011
Introduction
Shareholder litigation forms an important part of the structure of law and regulation affecting American busi-
ness. Because public regulators cannot oversee every company at every moment and cannot anticipate or 
even respond to every report of a potential wrong, a variety of remedies are left in the hands of shareholders 
themselves. Shareholders who have suffered at the hands of a corporation in which they have invested can 
sue—either as a class or on behalf of the company itself—to right these wrongs. They thus assume, with 
their counsel, the role of “private attorneys general,” with strong personal incentives to detect and prosecute 
corporate wrongdoing. The lawsuits they bring fill an important gap in the regulatory framework affecting 
American business.
Shareholder litigation exerts its regulatory effect through the mechanism of deterrence. That is, prospective 
wrongdoers realize, through the threat of litigation, that they will be made to account for whatever harms 
they cause and, thus internalizing the cost of their conduct, forswear bad acts. This basic mechanism of 
deterrence explains much civil litigation. Corporate officers and directors, understanding that they may be 
held liable to their investors for the harms they cause, refrain from engaging in conduct that will harm inves-
tors and induce them to sue. In this way, shareholder litigation regulates corporate conduct.
The problem with this story in the corporate context is that officers and directors are typically covered under 
a form of insurance, known as “Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance” or “D&O insurance,” that insu-
lates them from personal liability in the event of shareholder litigation. D&O insurance also protects the cor-
poration itself from liabilities it may have in connection with shareholder litigation. This insurance disrupts 
the deterrence mechanism by transferring the obligations of the prospective bad actor (the officer, director, 
or the corporation itself) to a third-party payer (the insurer). An actor that is no longer forced to internalize 
the costs of its actions is no longer deterred from engaging in harmful conduct—managers who are no lon-
ger personally at risk for investor losses are less likely to take care in avoiding them, and corporations that 
are no longer at risk from shareholder litigation are less likely to monitor the conduct of their managers—and 
the regulatory effect of shareholder litigation is diminished, distorted, or destroyed.
Unless, that is, the insurer does something to prevent this outcome. The introduction of D&O insurance 
essentially establishes the D&O insurer as a third-party intermediary in the regulatory dynamic. If sharehold-
er litigation is to deter bad corporate acts, it must be through the intermediary agency of D&O insurers who 
will have an opportunity to influence corporate conduct through the insurance relationship. Because they 
are the ones ultimately paying for the harms caused by their corporate insureds, insurers have ample incen-
tive to exert this sort of constraining influence, and they have the means to do so. We identify three ways in 
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which the insurance relationship may influence corporate conduct—through underwriting, monitoring, and 
the settlement of claims. The question thus becomes what influence D&O insurers do in fact exert through 
this relationship and whether this influence is sufficient to reintroduce the deterrence mechanism, thus pre-
serving the effectiveness of shareholder litigation as a regulatory device.
Shareholder Litigation
We use the term “shareholder litigation” to encompass all civil actions brought by current or former share-
holders of a corporation against the corporation or its managers for losses the shareholders have suffered as 
a result of actions taken by the corporation or its managers. This definition excludes criminal actions brought 
by prosecutors or other public authorities as well as enforcement actions brought by regulatory agencies, 
such as the SEC. It includes, principally, claims brought by shareholders under either federal securities law 
or state corporate law.
Both types of claims feature shareholders seeking relief from the corporation or its managers for investment 
loss. Both types of claims principally involve monetary damages, not administrative sanctions or criminal 
penalties. And both types of claims focus on misconduct by the corporation or its managers leading to loss-
es suffered by shareholders. Not all aspects of these claims are identical. Nevertheless, the claims seem to 
share the same basic functions, of both compensating shareholders for losses suffered at the hands of the 
corporation’s managers and deterring conduct that might cause such losses in the first place. . . . 
Deterrence is widely accepted as the fundamental purpose of shareholder litigation by courts and commen-
tators alike. The U.S. Supreme Court, for example, has long viewed the deterrence effect of private share-
holder litigation as “a necessary supplement to [Securities and Exchange] Commission action.”
The deterrence function of shareholder litigation connects it to corporate governance. “Corporate gover-
nance” is a broad concept that much of the legal literature has given a narrow definition. Scholars discuss it 
most often in the context of specific regulatory reforms or in terms of charter provisions and other structural 
characteristics of firms. But corporate governance may refer more broadly to any system of incentives and 
constraints operating within a firm. Corporate governance is designed to constrain bad acts on the part of 
corporations and their managers. Insofar as these are the same acts that will lead to liability in shareholder 
litigation, corporate governance and shareholder litigation pursue similar ends—both seek to make manag-
ers better serve the interests of their shareholders. Good corporate governance ought to lead to less share-
holder litigation, and the risk of shareholder litigation ought to lead prospective defendants to improve their 
corporate governance.
If we are thus to take deterrence as the basic rationale behind shareholder litigation, supplying it with its 
underlying purpose and justifying its existence, we are left primarily with questions about how well share-
holder litigation in fact accomplishes the end of deterrence. If shareholder litigation systematically fails to 
deter, it would fail to accomplish its underlying purpose and would have no reason to exist. Indeed, if share-
holder litigation fails to deter, radical reform would seem to be appropriate, either to correct the defects of 
shareholder litigation or to abolish it altogether.
Introducing Insurance
D&O insurance funds shareholder litigation. Almost every publicly traded corporation in the United States 
purchases D&O insurance to cover the risk of shareholder litigation. And most shareholder litigation settles 
within the limits of these policies. D&O insurance transfers shareholder litigation risk away from individual 
directors and officers and the corporations they manage to third-party insurers.
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Our research aims at uncovering the relationship between D&O insurance and corporate governance 
because, as we have already described, the question of the effectiveness of shareholder litigation as a regu-
latory device depends upon it. D&O insurance has the potential to insulate corporations and their managers 
from the consequences of liability rules that are expressly designed to penalize bad governance and encour-
age good governance. As a result, the D&O insurer thus assumes a pivotal role in the analysis. The question 
thus becomes, Does the D&O insurer have some means of passing along the deterrent effect of shareholder 
litigation or does the fact of D&O coverage distort or destroy the accountability mechanisms built into share-
holder litigation? In other words, what do D&O insurers do to deter bad acts on the part of their insureds? 
Since, after all, the insurers are the ones ultimately footing the bill for shareholder claims, they would seem 
to have ample incentive to control the conduct that might lead to claims.
Research Method
To study the relationship between insurance and shareholder litigation we have used the research tools of 
qualitative interviews and participant observation that have been employed most effectively in recent years 
by social scientists outside economics. Following in the footsteps of recent work by sociologists—Richard 
Ericson, Aaron Doyle, and Dean Barry and earlier work by Carol Heimer—we have sought to illuminate the 
governance function of insurance, gathering data by interviewing D&O insurance specialists and also by 
observing and participating in industry conferences on the subject. Our goals were to test our hypotheses 
about insurance and deterrence as well as simply to learn as much as possible about the role of D&O insur-
ance in shareholder litigation.
The research we report here is the first to systematically explore the relationship between liability and liability 
insurance through the entire insurance relationship, from underwriting to claims settlement, and to provide a 
theoretically informed account of the real world impact of this relationship on the particular form of liability 
that we examine. Thus, our research has both immediate policy relevance for securities regulators and the 
D&O insurance market and also long-term implications for liability and insurance research.
Roadmap of the Analysis to Come
Our findings show that D&O insurance as it is currently structured significantly undermines the deterrence 
value of shareholder litigation. Nevertheless, we offer a set of three narrowly tailored solutions that we believe 
both could and should be enacted in order to improve the regulatory effect of shareholder litigation. . . . 
First, because the pricing of D&O insurance may not sufficiently distinguish between good governance risks 
and bad governance risks to induce poorly governed companies to change their ways, we advocate the man-
datory disclosure of D&O policy details in order to signal information to the capital markets that, once incor-
porated into pricing, may provide additional incentives for corporations to improve their governance.
Second, because significant risk of moral hazard is created by the lack of insurer monitoring and the avail-
ability of entity-level coverage, we argued in favor of coinsurance for the corporate protection aspect of D&O 
insurance coverage in order to give the corporate policyholder more skin in the game and therefore greater 
incentive to monitor managerial conduct and insist that settlements in securities class actions reflect the 
merits of the claim.
Third and finally, we recommend additional disclosure of information at settlement—including insurance 
structure and limits and the extent to which settlement and defense costs are funded by insurance—in 
order to provide capital market participants with a window into the merits of claims, which they could then 
2 8  S P O T L I G H T  J O U R N A L
incorporate into their valuation of the defendant’s shares, thereby inducing prospective defendants to 
improve their governance quality in order to avoid meritorious claims.
Taken together, we believe that these proposals may serve to reinvigorate the deterrence function of share-
holder litigation. This is a critically important goal since deterrence is the raison d’être of shareholder litiga-
tion. If shareholder litigation does not deter, then it is, as its critics contend, nothing more than waste. But if 
we can improve the capacity of shareholder litigation to deter while still protecting individual directors from 
liability, then we will have accomplished our goal without the dislocating effects of more radical solutions, 
such as the abolition of shareholder litigation or prohibitions on the purchase of some or all parts of D&O  
liability insurance. … 
© 2010 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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Sonia Katyal
Focused on the overlooked intersection of intellectual property, civil rights, new media, and art, the scholarship 
of Professor Sonia Katyal asks provocative questions that anticipate the future of intellectual property law.
Her most recent book, Property Outlaws (Yale University Press, 2010), co-authored with Eduardo Peñalver, 
explores, in part, how disruptions to new media can alter the balance between law, technology, and property 
entitlements. The book argues that challenges to the regulation of property and intellectual property law can 
often, counterintuitively, improve the law by encouraging and protecting innovation and social welfare. Her 
forthcoming book, Contrabrand (Yale University Press, 2012), funded in part by the first grant ever awarded 
to a law professor by The Creative Capital/Warhol Foundation, studies the complex and controversial rela-
tionship among trademark law, advertising, freedom of artistic expression, and brand equity. 
A graduate of Brown University and the University of Chicago Law School, Katyal joined Fordham Law in 
2002 after specializing in intellectual property litigation at Covington & Burling. She teaches intellectual 
property, property, and civil rights at the Law School and was appointed Joseph M. McLaughlin Professor of 
Law in 2011. 
Katyal is one of the few young law professors in the country to claim more than four national awards for her 
scholarly work—including a Warhol Grant, a Yale Cybercrime Award, a Dukeminier Award, and an honorable 
mention from the American Association of Law Schools. Her scholarship frequently receives accolades for 
investigating the unexpected exclusions of individuals from property, intellectual property, and civil rights 
frameworks. “Exporting Identity,” Katyal’s first major article, published in the Yale Journal of Law and 
Feminism, received a Dukeminier Award from the Williams Institute at UCLA in 2002. The article examines 
civil rights protections based on sexual orientation from a transnational perspective. The New York Times 
Magazine profiled the next phase of semiotic democracy explored in “Semiotic Disobedience” from the 
Washington University Law Review, and the American Association of Law Schools gave the article an 
Honorable Mention in its 2006 Scholarly Papers Competition. More recently, Katyal has explored how prop-
erty frameworks affect the rights of indigenous peoples in a 2008 article published by the Yale Law Journal, 
“In Defense of Property” (co-authored with Kristen Carpenter and Angela Riley). She also continues to do 
pathbreaking work on trademark theory: Another article published by the UCLA Law Review, “Trademark 
Intersectionality,” explores the intersection of race, commercial branding, and advertising. 
“Stealth Marketing and Antibranding: The Love that Dare Not Speak Its Name” in the Buffalo Law Review 
was selected by the Entertainment Publishing and the Arts Handbook (West, 2011) as one of the best arti-
cles in media and entertainment law for 2010. The article looks at how the techniques of antibranding—
street art and other stridently non-commercial public forms of expression—have been co-opted as stealth 
marketing by companies. As this often informal advertising creeps into the public space, websites, and other 
mass audience channels, the line between brand and antibrand blurs. In the resultant ambiguous liminal 
space, companies employing stealth marketing resort more frequently to trademark surveillance and cease-
and-desist strategies to protect their brands.
Following a similar vein, “Privacy vs. Piracy” from the Yale Journal of Law and Technology addresses the 
implications of the nearly unfettered piracy surveillance and copyright enforcement tools that the law grants 
online companies. The paper, which won the Yale Cybercrime Award in 2004, describes how intellectual 
3 2  S P O T L I G H T  J O U R N A L
property rights online have changed from a defensive shield to an offensive weapon that tracks consumers 
and enforces standards of use and expression. If the laws can’t be changed to monitor the monitors and 
restore a balance between protecting copyright and civil liberties online, a small handful of people could 
turn the Internet into a regime that controls the actions of all future creators—whether their cultural products 
are legitimate or not.
Excerpts
Stealth Marketing and Antibranding: The Love that Dare Not Speak Its Name
58 Buffalo Law Review 795 (2010) 
“In the twenty-first century,” one commentator notes, “brands have acquired a place in the world unimagi-
nable in any previous period of history.”1 Consumers, too, have fallen in love with the brand. Brands perme-
ate the fabric of our lives—they help construct our identities, our expressions, our desires, and our lan-
guage. Yet inasmuch as they serve as powerful expressions of consumer identity and desire, they are also an 
important vessel of corporate identity and property.
By inhabiting these two worlds—the world of the consumer, and the world of the corporation—brands have 
come to play an increasingly vexing role in public consciousness. On one hand, they represent a proprietary 
vessel, a trade symbol that allows a company to symbolically encapsulate its identity—its goals, its products, 
and, increasingly, its philosophy. Yet on the other hand, brands are also becoming an expressive index of 
consumer identity and philosophy. Branding offers us a curious transformation of the corporate to the per-
sonal; it offers individuals a way to express certain identities, preferences, and passions symbolically: some 
wear Adidas and Nike shoes because they favor an active, athletic, physically competitive lifestyle, along 
with the philosophy of competitive living; others dress themselves in Prada’s subtle shades to suggest a 
demure, classic, sophisticated presence. These associations are tightly socially constructed through adver-
tising, but they are also images that are malleable and easily changed.
Further, at the same time that brands are expressive, they are also powerful devices of economic power and 
market dominance, a factor which leads to potent struggles over their meaning and definition. For, aside 
from the idealized convergence between personal and corporate identity that a brand represents, a brand 
can be also simultaneously deeply political and deeply commercial, and as part of our cultural conscious-
ness, a brand can often serve as a powerful organizing principle for political action. In just the last few 
decades, a new movement of activists has sprung up internationally and domestically, engaging in artistic 
and political activity to challenge the expansion of the brand into public discourse. Some types of “anti-
branding” seek to retake public space for their own expression, using graffiti and street art to dissent from 
the commercialization of the public sphere; some seek to simply rebrand or recode existing brands for the 
purposes of humor or social commentary. Sometimes antibrands might target a certain brand for opposition; 
at other times, they might utilize a brand for the purposes of satirical or humorous commentary on another 
subject. And yet, the ways in which these artists have done so have raised complicated questions of identity, 
language, and control— setting up a clash between the First Amendment and intellectual property.
1  THE EXPRESSIVE ORGANIZATION: LINKING IDENTITY, REPUTATION, AND THE CORPORATE BRAND 52 (Majken 
Shultz et al. eds., 2000).
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Admittedly, antibrands highlight a critical disjunction between the economic rationale of the marketplace 
and freedom of speech, and the regulatory, mediating role played by law. But today a major shift has taken 
place within the spheres inhabited by the brand and the antibrand, respectively. For many years, the brand 
and the antibrand peacefully coexisted, and most consumers were largely able to identify both by drawing 
upon context, in both the worlds of real and digital space. However, more recently as consumers have grown 
more and more overloaded with information, advertisers have been forced to seek out more creative ways to 
communicate their messages to the public, leading to a blurring of the lines between commercial and non-
commercial forms of expression. 
While most of us who live in urban landscapes are familiar with the recognizable dialogue offered by brand-
ing and antibranding, the increasing prevalence of guerrilla or stealth marketing has tended to blur the lines 
between traditional and nontraditional forms of advertising. Now, many stealth or guerrilla advertisements 
employ product placement, word-of-mouth marketing, and user-generated content, often employing self-
mocking humor in the process, transforming the world of advertising as a result. Normally, the blurring of 
boundaries between product placement and parody might be considered unproblematic from a viewer’s 
perspective. One might ask, what’s wrong with a little humor in advertising, however subtle the advertising 
might be? But the crossing of borders between parody and marketing—particularly regarding user-generat-
ed content and advertising messages that mimic its style and presentation—has presented particular chal-
lenges for lawyers, who must navigate the boundaries between non-commercial speech (usually the sphere 
of parody or an antibrand) and commercial speech (traditionally the sphere occupied by advertising).
A difficult set of legal issues stem from the crossover between stealth marketing and user generated content 
in both real and digital space. Today, branding opportunities can be cloaked within ordinary noncommercial 
expression, as corporate sponsorship extends further and further toward resembling user generated con-
tent, making it difficult to discern when content is sponsored and when it is not. Since many forms of stealth 
marketing often takes place within the nontraditional channels that antibranding occupies (public space, 
websites, and other forms of media and content), it becomes more difficult then for the consumer to distin-
guish between the brand and the antibrand, destabilizing the division between them. This shift carries sub-
stantial legal implications for trademark owners. When advertising is no longer limited to its traditional chan-
nels, the public sphere becomes littered with examples of both branding and antibranding. As a result, it 
becomes all the more necessary for trademark law to intervene, leading brand managers to act more readily 
to protect the goodwill behind their marks through an increasing reliance on trademark surveillance and 
cease-and-desist strategies.
I. The Rise of the Brand
In 1999, a Financial Times article prominently displayed a heading that said, “Ford to Outsource Important 
Parts of Car Assembly.”2 The article quoted a high-ranking executive who predicted that “[t]he manufacture 
of cars will be a declining part of Ford’s business.” He announced that Ford would instead “concentrate in 
the future on design, branding, marketing, sales, and service operations.”3
It is difficult to underestimate the historical significance of this shift, given Ford’s powerful role in the manu-
facturing industry in the United States. Rather than manufacturing cars, as Ford has done for so long, the 
announcement declares that Ford will simply engage in branding instead. Since the rise of the Industrial 
2  Tim Burt, Ford to Outsource Important Parts of Car Assembly, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1999, at 1; see also THE 
EXPRESSIVE ORGANIZATION, supra note 1, at 51.
3  Burt, supra note 2, at 1; see also THE EXPRESSIVE ORGANIZATION, supra note 1, at 51.
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Revolution, and for many of the last several decades, Ford Motor Company symbolized the victory of 
American invention over the uncertainties created by economic and political challenges. The success of 
Ford Motor Company marked a new path for industry—for the economy, for America—to follow. Now, 
almost several decades after that fateful moment when the first Ford car left its manufacturing plant, it 
appears that the American economy has steadfastly grown to value the Ford symbol—the brand—over the 
function of the original product. There has been much ink spilled on the dangers of Ford’s strategy of out-
sourcing for the American economy, but none on the impact of its switch to a branding factory.
The Ford story typifies the power of the brand. A brand is usually thought to be synonymous with trade-
marks and trade symbols, comprising an important and valuable component of a corporation’s intellectual 
property portfolio. Here, the economic and the semiotic spheres of language delineate the specific role that 
brands play in the parallel marketplaces of both goods and speech. In the past, a brand played a relatively 
limited role in marketing: it served to merely identify and distinguish a certain product. Today, however, the 
corporate branding strategy has both magnified and amplified these functions by reversing the function of a 
trademark. In other words, instead of serving as a product identifier, branding strategies today make the 
trademark— and the cultural identities associated with the mark—the product itself. This inversion between 
product and trademark is precisely what gives rise to the Ford narrative explored above—companies no lon-
ger focus on the product, but its brand instead. 
A complex matrix of meanings, products, and identities constitutes the essence of a brand. Yet this 
“essence,” so difficult to define and to pin down, is also the very thing that constructs a brand as both a 
commodity, as well as a sign of expressive significance. Indeed, the most successful brands enable a triadic 
convergence of sign, self, and corporate identity. And intellectual property law, too, plays an intimate role in 
enabling this convergence: corporate branding strategies focus specifically on the creation and propagation 
of trademarks through advertising. In this way, trademarks have become part of not only an economic mar-
ket, but also a metaphorical market because they involve— and propagate—a system of using signs to con-
trol meaning and language. In this sense, therefore, brands are economic, expressive, and identificative at 
the same time—for both the consumer, as well as the corporation.
How did this happen? The story here begins, at the end of the nineteenth century, when the corporate world 
was ensconced in an identity crisis. Despite the 1886 case of Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific 
Railroad, in which the Supreme Court endowed the business corporation with the legal status of “person” 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, corporations were largely regarded in the public eye as “soulless” enti-
ties, bereft of a definable essence or personality. As the giant business corporation became a permanently 
transfixed entity on the American business landscape, it became the very symbol of impersonality and diffi-
dence. Thus, corporations became increasingly aware of a massive need for public respect and social rec-
ognition. Public perception of “corporate soullessness” involved a perceived lack of conscience on the part 
of the corporation, coupled with the immense power, efficiency, and profit that large-scale companies 
represented. 
The public perception of a corporation as a cold, impenetrable entity created a need for corporate redefini-
tion. Across the board, corporations had to overcome these perceptions in order to become a definable per-
sonality, in order to attain and to communicate a sense of internal vitality to its employees, and to the general 
public. Part of this strategy focused on advertising as the central and most powerful way to alter this percep-
tion. Entrepreneurs began to infuse advertising with their image and personality, almost as if they were run-
ning for office: Henry Ford participated in automobile races; legendary *803 shoe manufacturer W.L. 
Douglas published ads in national magazines emblazoning his picture; King Gillette placed his clean-shaven 
personage on his ads; the Smith brothers placed their likenesses on boxes of cough drops. In the early 
F O R D H A M  L A W  3 5
1900s, the increased use of colors, simple logos, letterheads, and even depictions of the corporate factory 
all helped to suggest an image of an entity that constituted the sum total of the living, breathing individuals 
that worked within its auspices, rather than a cold, monolithic entity. 
At the very same time, corporate branding began to develop. Earlier, brands were largely synonymous with 
particular products, usually home products, including soap, jam, toothpaste, and breakfast cereals. Most 
companies during this early period used advertising that appealed to one’s rational considerations: the writ-
ten text of an advertisement, for example, offered an in-depth justification for a product’s use coupled with 
little suggestive imagery, and ads comprehensively detailed the good’s superior quality, attributes, and per-
formance. Because publishers tended to require that advertisement submissions conform to a rigid, dual-
column format, advertising was mostly limited to specific drafting of language, rather than the uses of sym-
bols and dramatic imagery to describe a product. However, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, mag-
azines, increasingly, became more and more dominant carriers of advertising, leading to a transition from 
verbal to visual styles of advertising. Agencies, rather than manufacturers themselves, became increasingly 
saddled with the responsibility of creating a particular essence, or identity, around the product in order to 
differentiate it from its competition. Advertising began to rely on an increasingly common array of symbols, 
slogans, poetry, testimonials, coupons, contests, stars, and humor. As a result, the advertising agency 
attained a newfound prominence as the vehicle by which home products became not only marketed, but 
personified as well. 
Today, branding strategies make up a significant portion of general corporate strategy; financial analysts 
claim that brand equity makes up a tremendous amount of company value. At times, a company’s brand 
equity has been more important than the book value ascribed to a particular product. Unlike the actual 
product, which is something with a functional purpose, a brand offers something in addition, an “added 
value” that consumers value enough to purchase. This ‘brand value’ or ‘brand equity’ is precarious and 
complex, comprising a host of tangible—and legally protectable—qualities such as physical appearance, 
packaging, design. On a more complex level, however, a brand also encompasses a host of intangible quali-
ties, such as consumer attitudes toward the manufacturing company, or beliefs about the brand in relation-
ship to one’s self and others. Increasingly, the intangibility of the latter has become a primary vehicle in 
building brand equity. Here, a brand encapsulates much more than a tangible product or trade symbol, 
logo, or name—it encapsulates the critical essence of a corporation—its products, its employees, and, 
increasingly, its consumers. It is this ephemeral added value that constitutes the value of a brand—its intan-
gible essence.
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Privacy v. Piracy 
7 Yale Journal of Law and Technology 222 (2004-2005)
Nearly twenty years ago, in a casual footnote at the end of an important essay, renowned property scholar 
Charles Donahue drew a distinction between “property as a sword,” and “property as a shield.”1 Donahue’s 
distinction symbolized an important difference between two facets of the institution—as well as the execu-
tion—of property rights; suggesting that property rights can be used for both defensive and offensive pur-
poses in relationships with third parties.
Today, Donahue’s distinction offers us a rich metaphor for understanding the transformation that has taken 
place in the digital era, particularly with respect to the relationship between intellectual property and privacy 
in cyberspace. As is now clear, the Internet is no longer a smooth-functioning patchwork of anonymous 
communication between peers. Instead, lurking behind the façade of such potential connections lies an 
increasing and subtle host of opportunities for legal accountability and detection, particularly where the use 
(or misuse) of intellectual property is concerned. The result, this paper argues, heralds an important shift in 
property rights in the digital era: compared to real space, where property rights tended to serve as a shield 
from harm, property rights in cyberspace serve to form the basis for a host of potentially offensive strategies 
that have deleterious implications for privacy, anonymity, and freedom of expression.
In recent months, strategies of copyright enforcement have rapidly multiplied, each strategy more invasive 
than the last. Today, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) and other copyright owners 
maintain automated Web crawlers that regularly survey and record the Internet Protocol addresses of com-
puters that trade files on peer-to-peer networks. After the RIAA’s initial victories, hundreds of subpoenas 
were issued— sometimes numbering seventy-five per day—each unveiling the digital identities of various 
Internet subscribers. Schools, responding to threats from the recording industry, have implemented pro-
grams that track and report the exchange of copyrighted files. A few have even decided to audit and actively 
monitor files traded by their students, at the RIAA’s request. And in recent sessions, there were proposals 
before Congress that placed intellectual property owners in a virtually unrestrained position of authority over 
ordinary consumers and intermediaries. The latest of these, the Protecting Intellectual Property Rights 
Against Theft and Expropriation (PIRATE) Act, sought to lower the burden of proof to impose criminal penal-
ties on individuals that engaged in acts of file-sharing, including sentences of up to 10 years. 
All of these different strategies share one thing in common: they rely on, invariably, private mechanisms of 
surveillance for their execution and control. And these techniques of surveillance—whether instituted by pri-
vate entities, or public law enforcement—demonstrate copyright’s increasingly tenuous relationship with 
information privacy. In the past, legislators and scholars have focused their attention on other, more visible 
methods of surveillance relating to employment, marketing, and national security. This paper, however, 
explores the phenomenon of “piracy surveillance,” an emerging area that is completely distinct from these 
other modes of consumer monitoring, and is incompletely theorized, technologically unbounded, and, 
potentially, legally unrestrained. As I will show, recent developments in copyright law—in particular, the 
DMCA—have invited intellectual property owners to create extrajudicial systems of monitoring and enforce-
ment that detect, deter, and control acts of consumer infringement. As a result, this paper argues that intel-
lectual property rights have been fundamentally altered—from a defensive shield into an offensively oriented 
1  Charles Donahue, Jr., The Future of the Concept of Property Predicated From its Past, in PROPERTY 28, 67-8 n.104 (J. 
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
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type of weapon that can be used by intellectual property creators to record the activities of their consumers, 
and also to enforce particular standards of use and expression, proscribing activities that they deem 
unacceptable.
This outcome is not solely attributable to the development of peer-to-peer technologies, or the explosion of 
piracy in cyberspace, as some might suggest. Rather, the outcome involves the comparatively more subtle 
failure of law to resolve the troubling and often rivalrous relationship between the protection of intellectual 
property and privacy in cyberspace. The irony, of course, is that both areas of law are facing enormous chal-
lenges because of technology’s ever-expanding pace of development. Yet, while both areas of law have 
enormously rich and well-developed areas of scholarly work and analysis, their interactions, particularly 
across the Internet, have been underappreciated by scholars. Today, however, they are on a collision course 
that cannot be overlooked much longer, sparked by two major developments in digital space: the rise of con-
sumer surveillance, and the problem of rampant piracy.
The motivation behind piracy surveillance may lie in the protection of copyrighted works, a laudable goal, 
but the end result, I shall argue, sacrifices the most valuable aspects of cyberspace itself, eviscerating prin-
ciples of informational privacy for the sake of unlimited control over intellectual property. While some intel-
lectual property owners might herald the development of protective frameworks for intellectual property 
owners, I argue that it destabilizes a critical balance between privacy, property, and expression. For the new 
piracy surveillance exposes the paradoxical nature of the Internet: it offers both the consumer and creator a 
seemingly endless capacity for human expression—a virtual marketplace of ideas—alongside an insur-
mountable array of capacities for panoptic surveillance. As a result, the Internet both enables and silences 
speech, often simultaneously.
The goals of this paper are threefold: first, to trace the origins of piracy surveillance though recent jurispru-
dence involving copyright; second, to provide an analysis of the tradeoffs between public and private modes 
of piracy surveillance; and third, to suggest the necessity for the law to restore a balance between the pro-
tection of copyright and civil liberties in cyberspace. As I will show, piracy surveillance has inverted the rela-
tionship between privacy and property, subordinating the protection of privacy to the protection of property. 
This has occurred in two basic ways: first, piracy surveillance enables copyright owners to utilize a type of 
monitoring that demonstrably trespasses on a person’s expectations of informational privacy and anonymity; 
and second, the use of piracy surveillance strategies, without conventional substantive and procedural due 
process constraints, has a harmful tendency to chill free expression in cyberspace.
In the first section of this paper, I review some basic principles of the relationship between privacy and prop-
erty in real space, and then apply them to cyberspace. I begin by surmising some of the basic assumptions 
that are both descriptively and aspirationally present in property ownership, and then argue that the archi-
tecture of cyberspace has destabilized the preexisting balance between privacy and property by eliminating 
the material conditions that permit the exercise of spatial privacy. Unlike property ownership in real space, 
which presupposes a degree of privacy by virtue of material seclusion, the public and private nature of prop-
erty in cyberspace—coupled with its immense digital mobility and decentralization—often come into con-
flict with one another, interacting within a sphere of confusing uncertainty. Instead of material seclusion, 
individuals operate under an assumption of anonymity, which significantly expands their expressive potential 
in cyberspace. At the same time, however, information harvesting is rampant, a factor which alters any pre-
sumption of balance between privacy and property in cyberspace.
Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the context of peer-to-peer transmissions. Here, I describe how 
peer-to-peer transmissions have enabled the rapid transmission of content, such as music, film and other 
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types of copyrighted material, facilitating a crisis of intellectual property. But it has also created a sort of cri-
sis for privacy and security, as well. By making one’s online activities, identities, and preferences transpar-
ently visible, peer-to-peer frameworks create a culture of panopticism by other individuals. This culture of 
panopticism, in turn, enables a variety of entities—government, private individuals, and copyright owners—
to exploit the power of peer-to-peer frameworks to develop an increasingly invasive system of surveillance to 
guard against piracy.
In the second section, I turn to the origins of piracy surveillance, and describe the myriad ways in which pri-
vate entities have successfully monitored transmissions in cyberspace to control uses of their copyrighted 
materials. Following the DMCA, I argue, court opinions have unwittingly facilitated the creation of a private 
regime wherein copyright owners and intermediaries engage in self-help surveillance of consumers. Piracy 
surveillance regimes take on three basic types, each displaying varying degrees of unilateral aggression: 
monitoring, which involves the use of automated systems to search for protected material; management, 
which involves a host of actions taken in real space and cyberspace to limit certain uses of cultural prod-
ucts; and interference, which involves a degree of preventative actions taken to prevent peer-to-peer file-
sharing from occurring.
In the third section, I assess the costs and benefits of such regimes, and argue that current, private regimes 
of copyright enforcement carry significant disadvantages, among them the potential to transform copyright 
law into a regime of “panoptic publication,” where future creators are essentially monitored by third parties 
for the infringing potential of their activities. Regimes of panoptic publication have especially deleterious 
(indeed chilling) effects on creations that rely on fair use for their validity, particularly transformative works. 
As I will show, piracy surveillance carries the potential to transform the nature of copyright from a liability-
based regime into a regime that governs the creation of all cultural products in cyberspace, both illegitimate 
and legitimate. This affects both speaker and audience in three primary ways: first, piracy surveillance 
enables ISPs to monitor and record the activities of their subscribers, thereby affecting the autonomy, ano-
nymity, and privacy individuals enjoy in cyberspace; second, piracy surveillance overdeters copyright 
infringement, affecting both the expression and fair use of non-offenders; and third, piracy surveillance 
affects the audience’s ability to access information without interference.
This paper takes the view that this conflict between privacy and piracy is important not just because it show-
cases a new, overlooked mode of surveillance, but also because it demonstrates the need to resolve con-
flicts between them in ways that are reflective—and protective—of the relationship between modern tech-
nology and personal freedoms. I conclude, therefore, by pointing out the need for greater public oversight 
over these private realms of surveillance, and suggest a number of ways in which we can envision a more 
protective sphere for individual autonomy in cyberspace. Towards that end, Part IV argues for greater judi-
cial supervision over the DMCA and offers a potential solution that is derived from the Privacy Protection Act 
and that balances protections for freedom of speech and privacy with the interests of law enforcement.
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Lawmakers and scholars have traced and retraced the cracks that spread through the economy and caused 
the financial crisis. But finding the fault lines that portend future fractures takes the keen eye of an expert 
like Associate Professor Richard Squire. 
Before joining the Fordham faculty in 2006, Squire obtained a J.D. from Harvard Law School and, in the 
same year, an M.B.A. from Harvard Business School. He then worked as an associate in the litigation 
department at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. At Fordham he currently teaches Corporations and Corporate 
Reorganization and Restructuring. In his recent article “Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt,” 
Squire homes in on how certain debt arrangements should be regulated by lawmakers to avert another 
financial catastrophe. The article was published in the Harvard Law Review and was recognized as one of 
the top 10 corporate and securities law articles of 2010 by the Corporate Practice Commentator. The article 
showcases Squire’s ability to identify fundamental problems overlooked by other scholars. 
The problem, in this case, is opportunism. Squire first describes the context: with growing frequency, the 
financial world uses derivatives and similar contracts to create contingent debts that are paid only when 
uncertain future events take place. The natural incentive for a firm’s managers is to sell contingent claims 
against the firm that are likely to be triggered only in future states of the world in which the firm will be insol-
vent anyway. Doing this ensures that the burden of the claims is borne by the firm’s general creditors rather 
than its shareholders. Thus, firms have a motive to take on contingent debts that are positively correlated 
with the firm’s insolvency risk. An example of such “correlation-seeking” conduct would be selling credit 
default swaps on mortgage-backed securities at the same time that the firm purchases such securities for 
its own portfolio, which was what insurance giant AIG did in the years preceding its 2008 meltdown. While 
correlation-seeking may enrich shareholders, it destroys social wealth through a host of social costs that 
include overinvestment, higher borrowing costs, financial distress, and potential systemic risk. 
In his earlier article “The Case for Symmetry in Creditors’ Rights,” published in the Yale Law Journal, Squire 
again uncovers a hidden problem with various types of borrowing arrangements. This time, his focus is 
secured loans, American general partnerships, and guarantee contracts. Squire makes the case that these 
widely used arrangements, which he calls asymmetrical, give some creditors an absolute advantage over 
others in the division of a debtor’s assets. On the flipside, symmetrical arrangements such as the corporation 
and common-law partnership give no one an absolute advantage, as they deliver a prior claim on a distinct 
asset pool to each creditor group. The symmetrical approach reduces debt appraisal costs, makes creditor 
monitoring more efficient, and speeds up bankruptcy proceedings. In another key improvement, symmetri-
cal arrangements are not as likely to exploit creditors such as tort victims who do not adjust to subordination 
of their claims. 
Squire proposes reform that would turn secured loans and other asymmetrical arrangements into symmetri-
cal devices for creating social wealth instead of transferring it. In the current, fragile economic climate, 
Squire’s proposal might be the exact type of symmetry that both creditors and debtors need.
Richard Squire
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Excerpts
Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt
123 Harvard Law Review 1151 (2010)
In 2005, near the peak of the recent housing bubble, derivatives traders at AIG were making money hand-
over-fist by selling credit default swaps linked to subprime mortgages. This in itself is not surprising: AIG is 
an insurance company, and a credit default swap in essence is an insurance policy on a bond or other debt 
obligation. What is startling is that AIG at the same time was buying up mortgage-backed securities in its 
own investment portfolio. This meant that the risks borne by the company were correlated: its assets were 
likely to plunge in value just as deep liability on its swaps was triggered. When the housing market collapsed, 
the combined damage to both sides of AIG’s balance sheet was more than enough to sink the company.
This Article explains why seemingly reckless conduct of this type can in fact be fully rational from the per-
spective of shareholders. Such conduct reflects an opportunism hazard presented by contingent debt, a 
hazard that is here termed correlation-seeking. If a firm’s contingent debts are especially likely to be trig-
gered when the firm is insolvent, the debt contracts transfer value from the firm’s unsecured creditors to its 
shareholders. This transfer creates an incentive for a firm’s managers to sell contingent claims against their 
firm that correlate—or that through asset purchases can be made to correlate—with the firm’s insolvency 
risk.
How Correlation Determines the Impact of a Contingent Debt
A debt is contingent if it becomes payable only upon the occurrence of an uncertain future event, known as 
the triggering event. A wide variety of financial contracts create contingent debts, including guarantees, 
options and credit default swaps. In each case, the debtor (the firm liable if the contingency occurs) receives 
one or more up-front payments, known collectively as the premium. In exchange, the debtor agrees to pay 
the claimant (the other party to the contract) a specified amount—known as the contract’s face value—if 
the triggering event comes to pass.
Contingent debts can serve socially valuable purposes. Many contingent debt contracts act as insurance 
policies on investments, and in that role they can be value-creating if the debtor is better positioned than the 
claimant to bear the downside risk on the investment.
Contingent debt contracts can, however, serve a less benign function: to enrich the shareholders of the 
debtor at the expense of the debtor’s unsecured creditors. To see how this could occur, imagine a hypotheti-
cal contingent debt contract which provides that the debtor will be obligated to make a payment to the 
claimant if and only if the debtor falls insolvent. Under such an arrangement, the debtor’s shareholders enjoy 
the benefits but bear none of the risk. If the debtor remains solvent, the contract expires without the debt’s 
being triggered, and the shareholders’ equity stake is enhanced by the amount of the premium. And if the 
debtor falls insolvent, the triggering of the contingent debt makes no difference to the shareholders, whose 
equity stake is wiped out anyway. Rather, the triggered liability is borne by the debtor’s unsecured creditors 
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because it dilutes their recoveries from the debtor’s bankrupt estate.1 In other words, such a contract con-
structs a perfect “heads we win, tails you lose” relationship between the debtor’s shareholders and unse-
cured creditors.
In reality, a court would likely refuse to enforce a contract that explicitly required a firm to make a payment 
only if the firm fell insolvent.2 However firms can—and often do—achieve an economically equivalent result 
by engaging in correlation-seeking. That is, firms can incur contingent debt that correlates, or that through 
asset purchases can be made to correlate, with their insolvency risk. And except in the extreme case of a 
contract that expressly defines the triggering event as the debtor’s insolvency, there is little that prohibits 
correlation-seeking under current law.
Correlation-seeking can take two general forms. The first, which might be called the “forward” type, occurs 
when a firm’s managers sell a contingent claim against the firm that would be triggered only in circumstanc-
es when the firm would likely be insolvent. An example would be when a parent corporation issues a guaran-
tee on a loan taken out by its subsidiary. If the parent’s largest asset is its equity stake in the subsidiary, the 
insolvency of the subsidiary would probably cause the parent to fail as well. Therefore, the guarantee on the 
subsidiary’s loan creates a contingent liability that the parent’s shareholders, as contrasted with its unse-
cured creditors, will almost never have to bear. And the second, or “reverse,” type of correlation-seeking 
occurs when a firm incurs contingent debt and then purchases assets that are especially likely to lose value 
at the same time the debt is triggered. A dramatic recent example is provided by AIG, which incurred large 
contingent liabilities by selling credit default swaps on subprime mortgage–backed securities, and then 
bought up subprime securities in its own investment portfolio. These asset purchases made it likely that AIG 
would be insolvent if liability on its credit default swaps was ever triggered. 
Regardless of whether correlation-seeking is of the forward or reverse type, the result is the same: a value 
transfer from the debtor’s unsecured creditors to its shareholders. The transfer occurs when the contingent 
debt is incurred, or—in the case of reverse correlation-seeking—when the firm purchases the correlated 
assets. And it consists of a decrease in the creditors’ expected recoveries and a corresponding increase in 
the value of shareholder equity. Though rational from the perspective of shareholders, correlation-seeking 
will often be wealth-destroying from a social perspective. This is because the opportunity for shareholders to 
expropriate wealth from creditors distorts a firm’s borrowing and investment decisions, leading to overinvest-
ment, higher borrowing costs, financial distress, and potential systemic risk. Firms that seek to transfer 
wealth end up destroying wealth.
Besides forcing them to shoulder more risk, a positive internal correlation can harm the unsecured creditors 
in a second way: it can shrink the premium. An increase in the “perceived” internal correlation—meaning 
the internal correlation that is evident to the claimant at the time of contracting—reduces the claimant’s will-
ingness to pay. And a reduction in the premium harms the unsecured creditors by shrinking the pool of 
assets available to them in the debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding. A positive internal correlation thus can land 
1 For a firm’s unsecured creditors to bear the full brunt of a contingent debt that is triggered when the firm is insolvent, 
the firm’s equity investors must enjoy limited liability, which is why those investors are referred to here as 
“shareholders,” implying a corporation. But limited liability is a feature of most of the other widely used modern 
business entities, including the limited liability company, limited liability partnership, and Delaware statutory trust. See 
Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1397 
(2006). Only the common law partnership continues to hold equity investors fully liable for firm debts.
2 One possibility is that a court would deem this hypothetical contract an improper “ipso facto” arrangement. Provisions 
of the Bankruptcy Code deny enforcement of ipso facto clauses in specific contexts. Alternatively, a court might deem 
the contract a deliberate fraudulent transfer. 
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a one-two punch on the unsecured creditors: it increases the likelihood that, if the debtor falls insolvent, 
they will have to share the debtor’s assets with the claimant; and it can decrease the value of those assets by 
causing the claimant to pay a smaller premium.
Why would a firm’s unsecured creditors permit its managers to engage in correlation-seeking? While oppor-
tunism of this type is not illegal as a matter of positive law, creditors in theory could negotiate loan covenants 
that prohibit it. As a practical matter, however, this approach will often not be cost- effective. Loan covenants 
will deter opportunism only if the creditors monitor the debtor for violations, as opportunism will otherwise 
be evident only after the debtor has fallen insolvent, at which point an enforcement action is ineffective 
because the debtor is judgment-proof. And for many creditors, especially those with relatively small claims, 
the necessary monitoring costs will exceed the expected losses that the monitoring would prevent.3 Thus, 
rather than monitor, many creditors will simply factor opportunism risk into the interest rate they demand up 
front from all debtors, a response that does not deter opportunism because the debtor pays the same inter-
est rate regardless of how it treats its creditors after it borrows.4 Finally, creditors will not bother to monitor if 
they believe that the government will bail them out if their debtor fails. Bailouts shift the loss produced by 
correlation-seeking from the debtor’s unsecured creditors to another group of “creditors”: taxpayers. And 
the correlation-seeking hazard will be at its zenith when creditors lack incentive to monitor, an observation of 
obvious importance as lawmakers continue to craft a response to the 2008 financial crisis.
For these reasons, correlation-seeking makes shareholders richer. Surprisingly, it usually also makes them 
safer. In this way, correlation-seeking stands in stark contrast to other forms of shareholder opportunism that 
scholars have studied. For example, higher leverage can enrich shareholders by increasing the degree to 
which creditors bear losses caused by declining asset values. But while higher leverage increases expected 
shareholder returns, it also raises the volatility of those returns, an unpleasant side effect for risk-averse 
shareholders. Therefore, higher leverage imposes a tradeoff between risk and return that in many firms will 
tend to make it self-limiting. A similar dynamic is seen with asset substitution, a stratagem in which a firm 
borrows against low-risk assets but then exchanges them for high-risk assets before the debt comes due.
Correlation-seeking, by contrast, can escape the tradeoff between risk and return. Unlike other types of 
shareholder opportunism, correlation-seeking does not force shareholders to bear more risk in order to cap-
ture higher returns. To the contrary, equity volatility typically falls when the correlation between the firm’s 
contingent debt risk and insolvency risk rises. Correlation-seeking reduces the volatility of a firm’s equity 
value because it makes it less likely that the firm’s contingent debt will be triggered when the equity has any 
value. Correlation-seeking therefore is more pernicious than both leverage and asset substitution, because 
only correlation-seeking typically holds no downside for risk-averse shareholders.
The Scale of the Hazard: Contingent Versus Fixed Debt
Despite the potential scope of the correlation-seeking hazard, neither lawmakers nor commentators have 
recognized the central role of correlation in the economics of contingent debt. Legal doctrines meant to pro-
tect creditors rely instead on principles designed for “fixed” debt—a term used here to mean debt that is 
certain to come due on a specified future date. Accordingly, a contingent debt is treated as less of an oppor-
3  See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 
Yale L.J. 857, 864 (1996); Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Contracting Out of Bankruptcy: An Empirical 
Intervention, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1226 (2005).
4  See Richard Squire, The Case for Symmetry in Creditors’ Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 806, 840–41 (2009) (making the same 
point with respect to the secured loan).
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tunism hazard because it is (by definition) less likely than a fixed debt to come due. On this view, a contin-
gent debt is like a fixed debt, only less so.
There are at least two basic problems with this standard view of contingent debt. The first is that, counterin-
tuitively, a contingent debt contract can capture significantly more wealth from a firm’s unsecured creditors 
than would a fixed debt contract with the same face value. This is because a firm that incurs a $100 fixed 
debt typically receives close to $100 in new assets in exchange. And those new assets mostly neutralize the 
debt’s dilutive effect on the firm’s unsecured creditors. But when a firm incurs a $100 debt that has, for 
example, only a 10% chance of coming due, the firm receives in exchange new assets worth no more than 
$10. And if this contingent debt is especially likely to be triggered when the firm is insolvent, the disparity 
between the new assets and the debt’s $100 face value greatly reduces expected creditor recoveries.
A second problem with legal doctrines that fail to distinguish between fixed and contingent debt is that the 
opportunism mechanisms are different for each. What matters most with fixed debt is its total face value rel-
ative to the firm’s equity value: the higher this ratio, the greater the degree to which losses are borne by the 
firm’s creditors rather than its shareholders. By contrast, a contract that creates a contingent debt with even 
a relatively large face value, can either benefit or harm a firm’s unsecured creditors, depending on whether 
the correlation between the contingency risk and the firm’s insolvency risk is negative or positive. For this 
reason, legal measures that consider only a debt’s face value, and ignore correlations, often produce results 
that are wholly unrelated to the actual opportunism hazard.
Correlation-Seeking and the Crisis of 2008
Conduct that is consistent with correlation-seeking played a key role in the 2008 financial crisis. Perhaps the 
most notorious financial crisis bailout was that of the multinational insurer AIG, whose trades in financial 
derivatives are widely blamed for the company’s spectacular unraveling in September 2008. To many 
observers, AIG’s implosion was the fulfillment of Warren Buffet’s prophecy that derivative contracts would 
prove to be “financial weapons of mass destruction.” The company merits special attention not only 
because of the amount of bailout money it received, but also because the Obama Administration has cited 
AIG as exhibit one in its case for more aggressive federal regulation of derivatives.
The standard account of what happened at AIG—and the account that the administration has adopted—is 
founded upon a key misperception. According to this view, a small band of derivatives traders, operating at 
the periphery of AIG’s mainline insurance businesses, was able to bring an otherwise sound corporate giant 
to its knees. But in fact the liabilities on AIG’s derivative contracts were not big enough in themselves to 
break the company. Rather, the conduct that undid AIG was a company-wide affair, in which derivatives 
traders at an AIG subsidiary sold contingent debts linked to subprime mortgages, and then fund managers 
at the AIG parent company cranked up the internal correlations on those debts by purchasing risky mort-
gage-backed securities for the company’s general investment portfolio. When the housing market collapsed, 
it was the combined damage to both sides of AIG’s balance sheet that brought the company to the brink of 
bankruptcy.
Correlation-seeking is consistent not only with the pre-crisis years at AIG, but also with conduct at the gov-
ernment-sponsored mortgage companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Both Fannie and Freddie incurred 
deep contingent debts, in the form of guarantees on mortgage assets, that were highly likely to be triggered 
en masse under conditions when their shareholders would already be wiped out. Conventional accounts 
attribute risk-taking in these three firms to mere recklessness or to schemes by managers to expropriate 
wealth from shareholders. But the fact that the companies incurred correlated asset and contingent debt 
risks suggests that their managers instead were trying to enrich shareholders at the expense of 
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creditors—or, as it turned out, taxpayers. Although the correlated risks ultimately materialized, driving the 
firms insolvent, it does not follow that the managers’ decisions were contrary to shareholder interests at the 
time they were made. But those decisions did ensure that insolvency, if it came, would be severe, which is 
why AIG, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac were the three firms that received by far the biggest bailouts. 
Furthermore, AIG, Fannie, and Freddie illustrate two different forms that correlation-seeking can take. AIG’s 
conduct during the run-up to 2008 is primarily consistent with reverse correlation-seeking, whereby a firm 
reallocates its investment portfolio into assets that increase the internal correlations on the firm’s contingent 
debts. Fannie and Freddie, by contrast, illustrate the type of correlation-seeking that occurs when a firm has 
passed the “tipping point” where its contingent debts are large enough in themselves to cause insolvency, 
and the firm piles on additional correlated debts that pose no downside risk to shareholders. In both cases, 
the broader point remains that conduct consistent with correlation-seeking helps to explain why the firms 
suffered such calamitous losses, at taxpayer expense, when their correlated risks materialized.
Reconceptualizing the Law of Contingent Debt
As mentioned above, legal rules for contingent debts take no account of correlations, relying instead on  
principles designed for fixed debts. This is true not only of the Obama Administration’s regulatory proposals in 
response to the 2008 financial crisis, but also of traditional creditor-protection doctrines such as fraudulent 
transfer law. In both cases, lawmakers need to shift the emphasis from face values to correlations if legal rules 
are to neutralize the incentives that create the risk of another AIG, Fannie Mae, or Freddie Mac–style collapse.
In the wake of the 2008 crisis, the Obama Administration has proposed broadly expanding federal regula-
tion of the financial sector. New rules would require financial firms to operate with less leverage, disclose 
more information about business risk, and pay their executives more in equity and less in cash. In addition, 
the federal government would acquire direct oversight of the market for financial derivatives. Importantly, 
none of these proposals hits the correlation-seeking hazard head-on. Some proposals—such as the lever-
age and disclosure rules—address correlation-seeking only obliquely, and may impose high compliance 
costs. And others—such as collateral requirements for derivatives and new executive pay rules—may in fact 
make the correlation-seeking hazard worse.
In light of these drawbacks to the administration’s proposed financial sector reforms, a better approach 
might be for lawmakers to remove legal impediments that now discourage creditors from punishing oppor-
tunism directly. The most important of these impediments are the special bankruptcy exemptions for deriva-
tive counterparties. Reinstating bankruptcy’s automatic stay and its prohibitions on preferences and ipso 
facto clauses would shrink wealth transfers by relegating derivative counterparties to the status of ordinary 
unsecured creditors. This change would also make counterparties more vulnerable to correlation-seeking, 
thereby encouraging them to monitor in order to prevent it. For example, if AIG’s sophisticated swap buyers 
had been more exposed to the risk that AIG would fail, they might have tried to prevent the company from 
reallocating so much of its investment portfolio into risky mortgage-backed assets.
Besides the bankruptcy exemptions for derivatives, another policy that lawmakers should revisit is the 
administration’s executive pay guidelines. This emphasis on equity compensation implies that the adminis-
tration is concerned primarily with conflicts of interest between managers and long-term shareholders. But 
at least at the biggest bailout recipients, the evidence suggests that the more serious problem was conflict 
between the interests of creditors on the one hand, and the interests of shareholders, as advanced by man-
agers, on the other. And the administration’s pay approach, by further aligning manager and shareholder 
interests, only exacerbates this conflict.
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Like current regulatory proposals, traditional creditor-protection doctrines also neglect correlation-seeking. 
In particular, fraudulent transfer doctrine is currently unsuitable for deterring contingent debt opportunism. 
Courts analyze fraudulent transfer challenges to contingent debts under the same principles they use for 
challenges to fixed debts, producing rulings that bear no meaningful relationship to the actual opportunism 
hazard. Therefore, fraudulent transfer law should be reformed to permit courts to subordinate a contingent 
debt if a high correlation between the contingency risk and the debtor’s insolvency risk was apparent at the 
time of contracting. Such a rule would nullify the wealth transfer away from the debtor’s unsecured credi-
tors, thereby reducing the incentive for shareholders to use such debts to expropriate wealth rather than cre-
ate wealth.
The Case for Symmetry in Creditors’ Rights
118 Yale Law Journal 807 (2009)
The foundation of modern bankruptcy systems is the pro rata rule, which pays all creditors an equal per-
centage on their claims. But debtors can, and often do, override the pro rata rule through asset partitioning, 
which is the nonconsensual subordination of creditor claims to particular debtor assets.1 Legal arrange-
ments that partition assets are both varied and ubiquitous, ranging from the corporation and partnership to 
the secured loan.
Because partitioning arrangements forcefully subordinate creditor claims, they transfer wealth away from 
claimants such as tort victims who do not adjust when their claims are impaired.2 Despite the social costs of 
these wealth transfers, previous scholarship has argued that partitioning arrangements can create value by 
providing various economic efficiencies.3 In weighing costs and benefits, however, this literature has taken 
little account of key differences in the ways that partitioning arrangements prioritize creditor claims.4
This Article provides an original framework for comparing the efficiency of different partitioning arrange-
ments. I identify a universal distinction between two basic types of asset partitioning, which I term symmetry 
and asymmetry. 
Despite their variety, all partitioning arrangements can be categorized as either symmetrical or asymmetri-
cal. Symmetrical arrangements divide creditors into groups and give each group a prior claim to a distinct 
asset pool in the debtor’s estate.5 An additional feature of symmetrical arrangements is that they give at least 
some creditors a “deficiency claim,” which is a right to levy on the debtor’s remaining assets to the extent of 
any shortfall in the creditor’s designated asset pool. Deficiency claims in symmetrical arrangements are 
1  Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1343-
48 (2006).
2  See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 
YALE L.J. 857, 898-902 (1996).
3  See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 398-
405, 423-27 (2000).
4  For example, the corporation divides a business owner’s creditors into two groups and gives each group the first claim 
to a distinct asset pool. In contrast, the secured loan gives one creditor a prior claim to one asset pool but confers no 
similar advantage on the debtor’s remaining creditors. Yet previous scholarship contends that both arrangements make 
it easier for creditors to appraise and monitor debtors, and does not consider whether one structure provides these 
benefits more than the other.
5  Under current law, the corporation, common law partnership, limited liability company, and Delaware business trust 
are symmetrical.
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always subordinated. In contrast, asymmetrical arrangements give prior claims to some creditors but not 
others, advantaging select creditors by according them both a prior claim to one asset pool and a pro rata 
claim to remaining debtor assets.6 
Symmetry describes creditor priorities in the common law’s “jingle-rule” partnership, as well as in limited lia-
bility entities such as the corporation, limited liability company (LLC), limited liability partnership (LLP), and 
Delaware business trust. In each of these commercial arrangements, the firm’s creditors have a prior claim 
to the firm’s assets, and the personal creditors of each owner have either a prior (under the jingle rule) or 
exclusive (under limited liability) claim to that owner’s personal assets. Asymmetry, in turn, represents the 
general partnership as modified by statute in the United States, where partnership creditors enjoy both a 
prior claim to partnership assets and, to the extent of any deficiency in those assets, a claim to personal 
assets paid pro rata with the claims of personal creditors.7 And it represents the secured loan, which gives 
the secured creditor a prior claim to the secured assets plus a deficiency claim to the unsecured assets that 
is paid pro rata with the claims of the unsecured creditors.8
The distinction between symmetry and asymmetry is powerful because symmetry is superior to asymmetry 
with respect to each of the major economic benefits of asset partitioning that scholars have identified. The 
implication is that, when parties opt for asymmetry, they do so for reasons other than wealth creation.
Asymmetry and Purported Efficiencies
The economic efficiency that scholars have most frequently attributed to various partitioning arrangements 
is the reduction of appraisal costs, which are the costs that creditors incur when evaluating a prospective 
debtor to decide whether to extend credit and on what terms. The first scholar to discuss appraisal costs was 
Richard Posner, who argued that the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, which abrogates limited share-
holder liability, makes it more expensive for creditors to evaluate lending risk. Although Posner’s argument 
was (in effect) a defense of the corporation’s symmetry, scholars subsequently have cited appraisal efficien-
cies as a benefit of various asymmetrical arrangements, including the secured loan,9 guaranty contract, 
and American general partnership.10
Yes, asymmetrical arrangements may generate some appraisal benefits relative to the pro rata rule. But the 
benefits are smaller than they are under symmetry. In particular, asymmetry does not tie lending risk to par-
ticular asset pools to the same extent that symmetry does, nor does it enable all creditor groups to specialize 
by lending against only a portion of a debtor’s estate. Therefore, appraisal efficiencies alone cannot explain 
why parties would choose asymmetry when a symmetrical alternative is available. Nor can they justify a 
decision by lawmakers to make an arrangement asymmetrical as a default rule.
Another purported benefit of partitioning arrangements is that they make it easier for creditors to monitor 
debtors and thus to prevent wealth-destroying debtor misconduct. Taken as a whole, scholarly commentary 
suggests that the difference between symmetry and asymmetry has little impact on creditor monitoring 
incentives. But in fact only symmetry makes efficient monitoring more likely. 
6  Under current law, the secured loan, American general partnership, and guaranty contract are asymmetrical.
7  Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 723(c), 92 Stat. 2606 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 
723(c)).
8  11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a)(1), 726(a)-(b).
9  See, e.g., F.H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REV. 1393, 1424-25 (1986). 
10  See Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, The New Business Entities in Evolutionary Perspective, 
2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 5, 10.
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Symmetry has a focusing effect, meaning that it increases the degree to which a creditor’s recovery is deter-
mined by the value of a particular asset pool. This focusing effect promotes the benefits of specialization 
and also permits creditors to capture more of the benefits of their own monitoring efforts, thereby ameliorat-
ing a collective action problem caused by the pro rata rule. Asymmetry, in contrast, provides neither of these 
benefits. This is because asymmetry has an insulating effect, meaning that it shields creditors from devalua-
tion of the assets to which the creditors enjoy prior claims. As a result, asymmetry discourages monitoring 
by those creditors who could most cheaply prevent a loss. In addition, asymmetry does little to overcome the 
collective action problem, and makes it harder for creditors to determine whether monitoring will be cost- 
justified. Asymmetry therefore does not improve monitoring incentives relative to the pro rata rule—and 
indeed in many situations may make efficient creditor monitoring less likely.
A third economic benefit of asset partitioning is quicker distribution of assets to creditors in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. Faster liquidation of debtor assets generates social wealth on the assumption that creditors can 
earn higher returns on a bankrupt debtor’s capital by reinvesting it elsewhere. The three partitioning varia-
tions fall along a continuum with respect to bankruptcy speed. Symmetry is more efficient than asymmetry, 
especially as applied to multiowner entities such as partnerships. And asymmetry in turn is more efficient 
than the pro rata rule. Symmetry is also the most efficient arrangement if each asset pool is assigned to a 
different court, such as when a partnership and its partners fall bankrupt and different tribunals handle the 
estates of the partnership and of each individual partner.11
Asymmetry as a Means for Debtor Opportunism
Why would debtors ever choose an asymmetrical arrangement? Symmetry is superior in terms of appraisal 
costs, creditor monitoring, and bankruptcy speed, and in a competitive market creditors will pass these  
benefits back to the debtor in the form of lower interest rates. The implication is that business organizers  
in the United States will always choose a symmetrical entity (such as a limited liability company) over the  
asymmetrical American general partnership. And debtors who borrow on a secured basis will always  
negotiate for clauses that subordinate or waive the secured creditors’ deficiency claims, rendering the loans  
symmetrical.12 Yet American general partnerships and (asymmetrical) secured loans abound, and thus 
demand explanation.
One explanation is transaction costs. Debtors must contract around default rules of asymmetry, and there 
will be settings where the costs of doing so exceed symmetry’s relative efficiencies. 
A second explanation is that a debtor who chooses symmetry does not capture all the social benefits for 
itself. Some creditors will be unaware of the debtor’s partitioning arrangement when they extend credit and 
hence will not reward the debtor for choosing symmetry. But these creditors may nonetheless benefit if sym-
metry causes another creditor to monitor.
A third, and likely most important explanation for the widespread use of asymmetry is opportunism, by 
which I mean the use of asset partitioning to transfer wealth away from creditors who will not adjust to subor-
dination of their claims. The division of debtor assets in a liquidation proceeding is a zero-sum game, and 
asymmetry tilts the playing field to favor some creditors over others. For this reason, a creditor will charge a 
lower interest rate if the debtor adopts an asymmetrical arrangement and slots that creditor into the advan-
taged position. And if this interest rate discount is greater than the relative social benefits of symmetry that 
11  Indeed, the opportunity to divide up partnership bankruptcies in this fashion was probably the impetus for the creation 
of the jingle rule by English courts after Parliament introduced a formal bankruptcy system in the sixteenth century.
12  Secured creditors in fact often do agree to waive their deficiency claims, making their loans nonrecourse.
5 2  S P O T L I G H T  J O U R N A L
the debtor captures (minus symmetry’s higher transaction costs, if any), the debtor will choose the asym-
metrical arrangement even though symmetry would be more efficient.
Because it transfers wealth, asymmetry also destroys wealth. The expected wealth transfer produced by 
asymmetry will lead to overinvestment by artificially depressing the interest rate demanded by the advan-
taged creditor. In addition, creditors who are “adjusting” will incur screening and monitoring costs to protect 
themselves from subordination risk. Importantly, adjusting creditors will incur these costs regardless of 
whether the debtor in fact adopts an asymmetrical arrangement, which means that the availability of asym-
metry imposes social costs even when all creditors are adjusting and hence no wealth transfer occurs. 
Moreover, adjusting creditors will demand higher interest rates to reflect their anticipated monitoring costs, 
which will produce a deadweight loss by making it unprofitable on the margin for debtors to secure funding 
for wealth-creating projects. These direct costs of opportunism mean that, even in settings where appraisal, 
monitoring, and bankruptcy-speed efficiencies are unimportant, the debtor’s mere option to adopt asymme-
try will destroy social wealth. Thus lawmakers should consider reforming asymmetrical arrangements to be 
symmetrical as a way of creating social wealth.
Symmetry applied: reforming the secured loan
The secured loan is, next to the business corporation, the most important partitioning arrangement in the 
modern economy, with approximately 70% of the assets of bankrupt commercial debtors pledged to 
secured creditors.13 It gives the secured creditor certain privileges—namely, protection against debt dilu-
tion, and a right to retrieve debtor assets conveyed to third parties—that are not provided by other asymmet-
rical arrangements, and that make the case for symmetry even more compelling.
The Secured Loan and Purported Efficiencies
Several scholars have argued that the secured loan reduces appraisal costs. For example, Richard Posner 
has suggested that the secured loan permits unsecured creditors to economize on their appraisal efforts 
because “the pool of unsecured creditors is smaller and the pool of assets available to satisfy the unsecured 
creditors is also smaller.”14 Cast in this way, Posner’s argument implies that unsecured creditors can disre-
gard both the amount owed the secured creditor and the value of the secured assets. But this is untrue: 
because of the secured creditor’s deficiency claim, a drop in the value of the secured assets often will harm 
the unsecured creditors even more than it harms the secured creditor.
The secured loan now provides somewhat greater appraisal economies to the secured creditor, whose prior 
claim to the secured assets reduces his exposure to the risk that the unsecured assets will depreciate. This 
benefit is heightened by the secured creditor’s property right in the secured assets, which makes it more 
likely that those assets will be available if the debtor defaults. These considerations suggest that a debtor 
can reduce overall appraisal costs by giving a creditor a secured claim to those assets the creditor can 
appraise more cheaply than other creditors can. But the secured loan’s asymmetry then works against this 
potential source of efficiency, because it makes the value of the unsecured assets an important component 
of the secured creditor’s overall risk exposure.
Symmetry would enable both secured and unsecured creditors to incur lower appraisal costs than they do 
now. If the secured creditor’s deficiency claim were subordinated, the value of the unsecured assets would 
13  The percentage of secured assets is probably somewhat lower for debtors outside bankruptcy, as debtors are more 
likely to issue secured debt when on the brink of insolvency.
14  RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 428 (7th ed. 2007).
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affect the secured creditor’s recovery only if the unsecured assets were above water even though the debtor 
was insolvent. Moreover, even if the secured creditor did recover from the unsecured assets, his share 
would be smaller under symmetry than under asymmetry. Symmetry therefore would further reduce the 
need for a secured creditor to valuate the unsecured assets when appraising a debtor’s estate. And unse-
cured creditors similarly could be less concerned with the value of the secured assets, because under sym-
metry the secured creditor’s deficiency claim could not affect their recoveries.
While several scholars have argued that the secured loan promotes creditor monitoring efficiencies, they 
have disagreed about which creditors it encourages to monitor. Thomas Jackson and Anthony Kronman 
began the debate by observing that a secured loan shifts risk onto the unsecured creditors, and then  
concluding from this observation that debtors issue security in order to increase the unsecured creditors’ 
incentive to monitor. Saul Levmore theorized that a secured loan instead encourages the secured creditor  
to monitor. Levmore argued that creditors will naturally try to free-ride on the monitoring efforts of others, 
but that a creditor will not mind monitoring on behalf of all creditors as long as he receives the priority right 
as compensation.
In the language of this Article, the Jackson-Kronman theory emphasizes the insulating effect of the secured 
creditor’s deficiency claim, and the Levmore theory emphasizes the focusing effect of the priority right. And, 
because it is asymmetrical, the secured loan has both effects. The problem is that the two effects work at 
cross-purposes, with each undercutting the monitoring incentives the other might create. The secured 
loan’s asymmetry squanders the opportunity for optimal monitoring incentives, because it insulates the 
secured creditor from a drop in the secured assets’ value. On the other hand, the secured loan’s asymmetry 
only moderately increases the degree to which the unsecured creditors capture the benefits of monitoring 
the unsecured assets. And it likely discourages them from monitoring the secured assets, because their 
payoff from doing so is highly sensitive to the secured assets’ value, and it is the secured creditor who typi-
cally will be able to assess that value most cheaply.
The secured loan would encourage efficient monitoring by secured and unsecured creditors alike if it  
were reformed to be symmetrical. If the secured creditor’s deficiency claim were subordinated, the insulat-
ing effect would recede, leaving the focusing effect to predominate. This would give the secured creditor 
greater incentive to protect the secured assets. Symmetry would also encourage efficient monitoring by  
the unsecured creditors, because it would reduce the overlap between the secured creditor’s claim and 
their own claims, thereby permitting them to keep more of the benefits of monitoring the unsecured assets 
for themselves.15
Finally, the secured loan’s asymmetry slows down liquidation proceedings by preventing a court from distrib-
uting unsecured assets without first determining the amount of each secured creditor’s deficiency claim, 
which requires verification of secured creditor proofs of claim and valuation of the secured assets.16 
Symmetry would remove this impediment to distribution of the unsecured assets. Symmetry would also 
reduce the incentive for unsecured creditors to contest secured claims, and indeed would eliminate it in sit-
uations where the secured assets had dropped further underwater than the unsecured assets had. In this 
way, symmetry would not only expedite distribution of secured assets, but also save on legal fees and free 
up judicial resources.
15  This observation necessarily applies only to voluntary unsecured creditors. No partitioning arrangement can encourage 
monitoring by involuntary creditors such as certain tort claimants.
16  11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2000).
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The Secured Loan’s Asymmetry as a Source of Opportunism 
Like other asymmetrical arrangements, the secured loan invites debtor opportunism by ensuring that one 
creditor will recover a higher percentage on his claim than others will if the debtor falls bankrupt. 
Subordination of the secured creditor’s deficiency claim would increase recoveries for nonadjusting credi-
tors, thereby reducing the amount of the expected wealth transfer. And smaller wealth transfers, in turn, 
would mean a reduction in the interest-rate distortions that cause overinvestment17 and less need for credi-
tors to incur costs to protect themselves.
Symmetry Versus previous Reform Proposals
Although symmetry is only the latest in a long line of reform proposals for the secured loan, it differs from its 
predecessors in one key respect: all previous proposals would scale back the secured creditor’s priority 
right. For this reason, previous proposals demand a tradeoff: they would increase recoveries for nonadjust-
ing creditors, but at the expense of social benefits that secured loans now provide in terms of appraisal 
economies and bankruptcy speed. And by leaving untouched the secured creditor’s deficiency claim, these 
proposals would do nothing to correct how the secured loan now discourages efficient monitoring.
Symmetry avoids the tradeoff inherent in each of these proposals. Like other proposals, symmetry would 
reduce opportunism costs by increasing recoveries for nonadjusting creditors. But symmetry would accom-
plish this result while preserving the priority right, thereby enhancing rather than undermining secured lend-
ing’s current economic benefits in terms of appraisal efficiencies and bankruptcy speed. And only symmetry 
corrects how the law of secured lending now discourages efficient monitoring. In other words, symmetry is 
the only proposal with no evident economic downside. In addition, the fact that symmetry leaves intact the 
secured creditor’s priority right makes it more attractive politically, as the priority right is at the core of the 
traditional conception of secured lending.
Similar economic benefits likely would result from parallel reform of the American general partnership, 
which also is asymmetrical under current law. In particular, subordination of the claims of partnership credi-
tors to partners’ personal assets would discourage parties from using the partnership to transfer wealth 
away from the partners’ personal creditors, and would pay social dividends through lower debt appraisal 
costs, better creditor monitoring, and faster liquidation proceedings.
17  For an analysis consistent with this one, see George G. Triantis, Financial Slack Policy and the Law of Secured 
Transactions, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 35, 50 (2000).
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